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1 Introduction
The implementation of an inﬂation targeting regime1 in New Zealand in 1990 trig-
gered a remarkable world wide surge of central bank reforms, that lasted well into
the new millennium. Across the globe the purpose of all of these reforms was
virtually the same: First, to increase the independence of central banks by dras-
tically limiting the political inﬂuence on central bank executives, and secondly, to
legally impose price stability as the only (or at least main) goal of monetary insti-
tutions. This wave of reforms was initially almost limited entirely to industrialized
countries (profound central bank modiﬁcations took place for example in Canada
(1991), the UK (1992), Sweden (1993) and Australia (1993))2. However, around
the year 2000 it also spread to eastern European and other emerging economies,
resulting in substantial central bank reforms in the Czech Republic (1998), Brazil
(1999), South Africa (2000) and Hungary (2001).
Finally, also the European Central Bank (ECB), founded in 1998, strongly reﬂects
this trend towards increased central bank independence and inﬂation awareness,
as its institutional setup uniﬁes high degrees of both political independence and
inﬂation aversion.
Only few real world changes have been so signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by a series of new
ﬁndings in theoretical research, like this wave of central bank reforms. The roots
of this trend can be traced back to the inﬂuential result, that also benevolent and
rational governments create upward biased inﬂation rates whenever they conduct
1An inﬂation targeting regime is generally considered as an institutional central bank frame-
work including the following points: Adoption of an explicit numerical inﬂation target, (op-
erational) independence of central banks in executing their monetary policy, and high levels
of policy transparency and accountability (Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia, 2002).
2See Central Bank of Iceland (2007).
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monetary policy on their own. This ﬁnding provided the basis for further research
which concluded that this inﬂation bias can be reduced by delegating monetary
policy to an independent, monetary conservative central bank.
In my thesis I want to provide a detailed insight into the concepts which motivated
this observed trend of central bank reforms. For this purpose, I will ﬁrst derive the
underlying theoretical rationale for upward biased long run inﬂation rates. In the
following, the most important proposals which aim at reducing this bias will be in-
troduced. Here, my attention will focus in particular on the concept of the weight
conservative central banker, since it was especially this notion which has signif-
icantly inﬂuenced the global reform wave (Romer, 2006, p. 517). Finally, I will
present some recent theoretical results, which question the optimality of monetary
conservatism. Since these models explicitly allow for monetary-ﬁscal interactions,
especially in the light of the current European debt crisis their ﬁndings provide
useful insights into the possible indirect eﬀects of monetary conservatism on ﬁscal
policy and public debt; an issue that has not been considered thus far.
My thesis will be organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 provide some general facts
related to inﬂation. Section 4 focuses on the formulation of the time inconsistency
problem in monetary politics and the resulting inﬂation bias. Section 5 introduces
the three most inﬂuential concepts for reducing this inﬂation bias, where attention
will be focused on the concept of the weight conservative central banker. Section
6 presents the concept of the conservative central banker within modern micro
based model frameworks with endogenous ﬁscal policy and public debt. Section 7
concludes.
2
2 Inflation: Basic concepts
2.1 Defining inflation
The term inﬂation in its contemporary understanding is generally deﬁned as a con-
tinuous increase in the general level of prices3 and thus as price inﬂation. However,
considered within a historical context, the meaning of the word inﬂation has al-
ready been subject to notable changes.
The original deﬁnition of inﬂation, which dominated economic literature from the
emergence of the term in the middle of the nineteenth century onwards until the
early years of the twentieth century, was that inﬂation deﬁnes a change in the
supply of paper money relative to the amount of circulating precious metal coins
(Bryan, 1997). Thus its original meaning was completely uncoupled from any price
considerations, since such a monetary inﬂation normally occurred in the absence
of any changes in the general price level. However, as paper money gained more
importance at the beginning of the last century, the clear distinction between cur-
rency (i.e. paper money) and traditional money (metal coins) became blurry and
thus also this traditional deﬁnition of inﬂation lost its practical value. For that
reason in the early years of the twentieth century economists started to redeﬁne
monetary inﬂation as any change in the supply of a circulating medium relative
to some given trade needs. In order to measure this excess supply, it became
common to use the average price level as a new reference value. Consequently
inﬂation departed from deﬁning a currency condition to describing a money and
price condition. The ﬁnal step, which then ultimately uncoupled inﬂation from
any monetary component, was undertaken by John Maynard Keynes in his famous
3See for example the prominent inﬂation deﬁnitions in Friedman (1963) or Laidler and Parkin
(1975).
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work The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936).
Here Keynes argued that though money growth is an important determinant of
inﬂation, it is by far not the only one. Also demand and supply issues, that is the
real part of the economy, play an important role in the determination of the price
level. Consequently he redeﬁned inﬂation as any increase in the general price level
and thus ultimately altered the perception of inﬂation from monetary inﬂation to
price inﬂation.
2.2 Measuring inflation
Price-inﬂation in a given period is measured by the inﬂation rate. The inﬂation
rate simply denotes the rate at which the general price level increases from one
time period to the next period:
pit =
Pt − Pt−1
Pt−1
,
where Pt is the general price level at period t and pit is the corresponding net rate
of inﬂation.
Obviously the level of the inﬂation rate ultimately depends on how this price
level is being determined. In practice there exist many diﬀerent approaches of
price measurement and thus also many types of inﬂation. However, the two most
common measures to capture the general evolution of prices within an economy
are the GDP Deﬂator and the Consumer Price Index (CPI), since both of them
cover a fairly broad range of goods (Blanchard and Illing, 2004, p. 52) .
The GDP Deﬂator measures the average price level of all produced ﬁnal goods in
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an economy, Pt, by the ratio between the nominal GDP (the GDP measured in
current prices) and the real GDP (the GDP measured in prices of a base year),
Pt =
GDPnominal,t
GDPreal,t
.
The consumer price index, in turn, tries to capture the inﬂation burden of an aver-
age household by measuring the price development of consumption goods. Hereby
the current costs of a representative consumer basket4 are divided by the costs of
the same basket in a given base year. In order to account for changes in tastes or
in the range of oﬀered products, the list of covered goods in the consumer basket
is updated frequently.
2.3 The costs and benefits of inflation
Though inﬂation has always been a big matter of concern throughout the last cen-
tury until today, economists still struggle with providing reasonable explanations
for the strong public dislike of inﬂation. As pointed out in Romer (2006) [t]here
is a wide gap between the popular view of inﬂation and the costs of inﬂation that
economists can identify. (Romer, 2006, p. 547)
In order to provide a structured overview of the most prominent positive and neg-
ative eﬀects of inﬂation, I will diﬀerentiate between the costs of fully anticipated
inﬂation and the costs and beneﬁts of unanticipated inﬂation5.
4The term representative consumer basket denotes a list of goods normally consumed by an
average household within a certain time period, say a month (Mankiw, 2003, p. 36).
5The terms costs and beneﬁts will refer to the positive and negative eﬀects of inﬂation
on social welfare. While unanticipated inﬂation features both positive and negative welfare
eﬀects, there can be hardly identiﬁed any beneﬁts from anticipated inﬂation.
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The meaning of anticipated and unanticipated inﬂation is straight forward: An-
ticipated inﬂation deﬁnes an actual inﬂation rate equal to inﬂation expectations,
whereas unanticipated or surprise inﬂation denotes the diﬀerence between the ac-
tual and the expected inﬂation rate6 (Abel and Bernanke, 2005, p. 456ﬀ). It is
generally assumed that anticipated inﬂation may occur both in the short and in
the long run, whereas surprise inﬂation is just a short run phenomenon (since a
repeatedly occurring surprise is clearly no longer a surprise).
2.3.1 The costs of anticipated inflation
The main eﬀect of an inﬂation rate perfectly anticipated by economic agents is an
equivalent increase in prices and consequently in all nominal variables. Some of
the reasons why such anticipated changes in the general price level provoke costs
for economic agents are: Higher transaction costs (shoe leather costs), costs of
price adjustments (menu costs) and costs due to the general dislike of inﬂation
(direct utility costs). The following brief description will deal with each of these
cost factors in greater detail:
1. Shoe leather costs
Shoe leather costs originate from the linkage between anticipated inﬂation
and nominal interest rates. This relation is formalized in the Fisher principle,
which states that any nominal interest rate i equals (approximately) the real
interest rate r plus the rate of inﬂation expected over the interest period, pie,
i ≈ r + pie.
6Note that the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated inﬂation is purely analytical
and stands in no direct relation with actual historical inﬂation periods (Parklin, 2008).
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Thus in the case of perfectly anticipated inﬂation pi = pie holds and nominal
interest rates move simultaneously with inﬂation, leaving the real interest
rate unchanged. However, an increase in nominal interest rates also implies
rising opportunity costs of holding idle money for daily purchases. Since cash
does not yield any interest, people will tend to economize their money hold-
ings when inﬂation and consequently interest rates are rising, thus shifting
more of their wealth into interest bearing assets. However, since transform-
ing assets back into liquid cash involves costs, such a decrease in real money
holdings will also make cash-based transactions more expensive where the
resulting costs are deﬁned as shoe leather costs7 (Mankiw, 2003, p. 109ﬀ).
2. Menu costs
Menu costs denote the costs of nominal price adjustments, which clearly also
arise when price changes have been expected correctly. Such costs include
for example reprinting catalogs or menu cards or rewriting nominal contracts
(Abel and Bernanke, 2005, p. 457).
3. Direct utiliy costs
Some authors argue that anticipated inﬂation is socially costly simply be-
cause people dislike inﬂation (e.g. Shiller, 1997). Since agents relate to their
economic environment in a nominal scale unit (e.g. Dollars or Euros), they
may ﬁnd large changes in this measuring unit as inconvenient or disturbing,
even though the real value of their wealth has not changed (Romer, 2006,
7This term shall ﬁguratively emphasize how anticipated inﬂation increases transaction costs.
Since in the presence of high interest rates economic agents will leave almost their entire
money at their bank deposits, they will have to go more often to the bank for withdrawals,
causing -amongst increasing time and energy costs- that their shoes get worn out more quickly.
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p.549). Others relate this public dislike of inﬂation to the fact that peo-
ple misconceive the actual eﬀects of inﬂation. Katona (1976) for example
argues that inﬂation is often just noticed as an increase in prices, whereas
involved wage increases are generally overseen. This distorted public percep-
tion causes that people think that they are always worse oﬀ when there is
inﬂation.
2.3.2 The costs of unanticipated inflation
There also exist several reasons why unanticipated inﬂation is socially costly. One
of the main causes is the short run rigidity of almost any nominal variable. Since
contracts are normally negotiated in nominal terms which cannot be altered in-
stantaneously, an inﬂation rate higher than expected by the negotiating parties
can lower the real value of these contracts ex post, involving unexpected gains or
losses to the contracting parties (Mankiw, 2003, p. 119).
Another consequence of unexpected inﬂation is its alteration of the ex post real
interest rate. A reformulation of the above presented Fisher equation shows that
the ex ante real interest rate r is given by the agreed nominal interest rate it
minus the expected inﬂation rate, piet , that is r = it − piet . However, the actual
ex post real interest rate, rPost, is given by the nominal interest rate minus the
actually realized inﬂation rate, rPost = it − pit. Thus whenever there is surprise
inﬂation, the ex post real interest rate rPost will be lower than the desired real
interest rate r, causing an unpredictable redistribution of wealth from lenders to
borrowers (Mankiw, 2003). As a result, intertemporal decisions based on the ex
ante real interest rate can turn out to be suboptimal in the light of the actual ex
post real interest rate (McCallum, 2008).
Yet, from the viewpoint of the economy as a whole such unpredictable shifts of
wealth caused by surprise inﬂation still do not represent social costs in its actual
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sense, since overall wealth is not diminished but just redistributed. However, since
economic agents are generally risk averse, they will spend a part of their resources
on protecting themselves against surprise inﬂation which otherwise could have been
used in a more eﬀective way. It it this socially unproductive usage of resources
which can be identiﬁed as welfare costs arising from unanticipated inﬂation (Abel
and Bernanke, 2005, p. 457).
2.3.3 The benefits of unanticipated inflation
However, from a (benevolent) policymaker's point of view there also exist various
arguments in favor of creating surprise inﬂation (see, for example, Barro and Gor-
don, 1983a; Fischer and Modigliani, 1978; Fischer, 1995) . The most prominent
argument for surprise inﬂation relates to the temporary trade oﬀ between unex-
pected inﬂation and short run growth, the so-called short run Phillips curve trade
oﬀ. By actively creating unanticipated inﬂation, a policymaker can push both
employment and output temporary above their natural levels, which also leads to
a temporary improvement in social welfare (when overall welfare is increasing in
the output level, as is generally assumed).
The second advantage of surprise inﬂation refers to governmental revenues. Since
economic agents use their inﬂation expectations in order to determine the level
of their real cash holdings (see the previous section), governments can tax away
the real value of these nominal holdings simply by creating surprise inﬂation. The
advantage of such an inﬂation tax compared to other conventional taxes is that it
is levied ex post, when decisions over nominal money holdings have already been
undertaken. So in contrast to other forms of taxation, the inﬂation tax does not
distort the microeconomic decision process of economic agents. Consequently, if
a policymaker uses surprise inﬂation in order to raise money for ﬁnancing public
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spending needs, he can in exchange lower conventional tax rates and therefore re-
duce economic distortions.
A similar argument ﬁnally relates to the third advantage arising from unantici-
pated inﬂation. Since government liabilities are predominantly ﬁxed in nominal
terms, a policymaker can considerably reduce both the real value of its outstanding
debt stock as well as the real value of interest payments simply by inﬂating beyond
expectations. The consequently reduced real debt service then again allows the
policymaker to lower the average tax level, with the resulting beneﬁcial eﬀects for
overall society (Dwyer Jr., 1993).
3 A simple model of inflation
Having reviewed the most important eﬀects of inﬂation, in this section I will pro-
vide a brief overview of the main causes of inﬂation, both in the short as well as
in the long run. For this purpose I will use a simple stochastic AS/AD model, in
which -for the sake of brevity- I will restrict the analysis to the closed economy
case.
The AS/AD model is a macroeconomic framework, which is used to model short
run economic ﬂuctuations as well as an economy's convergence to its long run
equilibrium. The model consists of two parts: an aggregate demand block (AD
equation), made up by a goods market equation (IS curve) and a money market
equation (LM curve), and an aggregate supply part (AS equation). The economics
literature describes diﬀerent versions of AS/AD models, such as Keynesian, New
Keynesian, Monetarist or Classical versions, which all exhibit notable diﬀerences
in their theoretical setup. Since most of the theory on monetary conservatism
bases on the Keynesian assumption of short run nominal rigidities, here I will also
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use a standard Keynesian version of the AS-AD model. The employed log linear
model equations will be of the following form8:
IS : yt = d¯− αrt + t, (3.1)
LM : mt − pt = γyt − β(rt + Et−1(pit)) + vt, (3.2)
AD : yt =
1
γ + β/α
(
mt − pt + β(d¯/α + Et+1(pit) + t/α)− vt
)
, (3.3)
AS : yt = y¯ + δ(pit − Et−1(pit)) + st, (3.4)
where yt, mt and pt denote real GDP, the (exogenous) nominal money supply
9
and the average price level, respectively. Furthermore rt deﬁnes the real interest
rate prevailing in period t, pit = ∆pt = pt − pt−1 is the period t inﬂation rate,
and Et−1(pit) denotes rational period t inﬂation expectations formed in t− 1. The
coeﬃcients α, β, γ and δ are assumed to be positive, and λ will be bounded between
zero and one. Finally t, vt and st denote stochastic short run disturbance terms,
which are assumed to be i.i.d. with x ∼N(0,σ2x) for x = , v, s.
3.1 A brief model explanation
For the sake of clarity I will start with a brief explanation of the model equations
(3.1) to (3.4).
First, the IS equation (3.1) describes equilibrium on the goods market: Supply of
goods, i.e. real GDP yt, on the left hand side equals demand for goods on the
right hand side. In this very simpliﬁed version, real goods demand just consists
8The model is a slightly modiﬁed version of the Neoclassical/Keynesian Synthesis model pre-
sented in Minford and Peel, 2002, p. 21.
9In this context money may be interpreted as high powered money, i.e. currency and reserves,
which do not yield any interest.
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of a constant term d¯, an interest elastic term αrt and a stochastic shock term t.
Next, the LM curve (3.2) characterizes equilibrium on the money market. Supply
of real money, mt − pt, equals demand for real money, which is increasing in real
output yt and decreasing in the nominal interest rate deﬁned as rt + Et−1(pit).
Additionally also real money demand includes a stochastic shock term, vt. The
AD curve (3.3) is simply the combination of the the IS equation (3.1) and the LM
equation (3.2). It describes overall aggregate demand in the economy. Finally,
the AS curve (3.4) captures the supply side of the economy. Actual period t
production, yt, ﬂuctuates around some long run constant trend y¯, where this so
called natural rate of production is uniquely determined by real factors in the
economy, such as the capital stock or the production technology. Fluctuations
around this natural rate happen for two reasons: First, whenever actual period t
inﬂation does not coincide with expected inﬂation but rather settles above or below
these expectations, also actual production either lies above or below the long run
natural rate. Second, also supply disturbances, such as unexpected changes in
input prices, can cause actual output to departure from its long run trend.
One big advantage of the AS-AD model is that it also permits for a graphical
analysis of economic processes, in which both the AD and the AS curve are plotted
in a (y, pi) space. In such a diagram the AD curve is downwards sloping, since an
increase in the price level leads ceteris paribus to a decrease in real output. The
AS curve in turn has a positive slope, because an increase in inﬂation leads ceteris
paribus to an increase in real output.
12
real Output
Inflation
AD AS
Figure 3.1 The AS-AD model
3.2 Causes of inflation in the short and in the long run
Using this model framework, the following two subsections will turn to the pre-
sentation of the roots of inﬂation in the long and in the short run.
3.2.1 Causes of long run inflation
First consider long run inﬂation. The long run is generally deﬁned as the time
horizon at which an economy settles at its steady state equilibrium. At this long
run equilibrium prices are growing at a constant rate, called the long run or core
inﬂation rate, p¯i. Furthermore, in the long run economic agents have gathered
suﬃcient information about the nature of the economy, such that long run inﬂation
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forecasts will always coincide with realized inﬂation rates. Combining these two
issues implies that in the long run the following equality has to hold:
E(pi) = pi = p¯i. (3.5)
Using (3.5) in (3.4) shows that in the long run real GDP equals its natural rate, y¯,
irrespectively of the level of the prevailing inﬂation rate (The long run AS curve
thus is a vertical line in an (y, pi) space.). The actual level of long run inﬂation
thus has to be ultimately determined by the relative position of the long run AD
curve (see Figure 3.2). In order to see what determines the position of the long
Inflation
long run AD
long run AS
real Outputy¯
p¯i
Figure 3.2 The AS-AD model in the long run
run AD curve, ﬁrst rewrite the AD equation (3.3) in a diﬀerentiated form, which
gives:10
10Since here aggregate demand in the long run is considered, clearly the short run disturbance
terms  and v are both zero.
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∆y¯ =
1
γ + β/α
(∆m−∆p+ β∆E(pi)) . (3.6)
Next, substituting p¯i for ∆p and rearranging yields:
p¯i = ∆m−∆y¯(γ + β/α) + β∆E(pi). (3.7)
In two steps equation (3.7) can be further simpliﬁed. First, since in the long run
real output equals its natural level, ∆y¯ has to be zero and the second term in (3.7)
cancels out entirely. Second, because of the equality in (3.5) also ∆E(pi) will be
zero in the long run such that also the third term in (3.7) cancels out. This ﬁnally
leaves the growth rate of the nominal money supply as the only factor determining
long run inﬂation, meaning that in the long run monetary inﬂation is equivalent
with price inﬂation.
Assuming additionally long run economic growth does not substantially alter this
proposition. In this case equation (3.7) would change to
p¯i = ∆m− g(γ + β/α), (3.8)
where g = ∆y¯ denotes trend growth of real GDP. Thus in the case of long run
growth, any increase in the nominal money supply above g(γ+β/α) would translate
one to one into inﬂation. This is also intuitively plausible: Since demand for money
is increasing in the real output level (if more goods are produced, more money is
needed to buy them), in the presence of long run economic growth also the nominal
money supply has to grow at a suﬃciently high rate in order to satisfy steadily
increasing money demand. In the above example this critical value of money
growth equals g(γ + β/α): Any money growth rate above this level will trigger an
increase in prices, i.e. inﬂation, whereas any growth rate below this critical value
will trigger a reduction in the general price level, that is deﬂation.
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3.2.2 Causes of short run inflation
In contrast to long run trend inﬂation, short run price inﬂation is not a purely
monetary phenomenon. As Figure 3.3 illustrates, either an upwards shift of the
AD or the (short run) AS curve causes short run inﬂation to rise above trend in-
ﬂation (points A and B in Figure 3.3), whereas a converse movement of the curves
depresses inﬂation below its trend. However, though an upwards movement of
real Output
Inflation
AD AS
p¯i
y¯
AS’AD’
A B
ASlong
C
Figure 3.3 The AS-AD model in the short run
both of these curves leads to an increase in inﬂation, due to the respective behav-
ior of real output these two cases are still diametrically diﬀerent.
In the case of an upwards shift of the AD curve the economy moves along the
short run AS curve. The resulting demand pressure pulls aggregate output above
trend, but also leads to an increase in inﬂation. Because it is increased aggre-
gate demand which causes the price level to rise, such a short run inﬂation is also
called demand-pull inﬂation. In the case of an upwards shift of the short run AS
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curve, however, there is a movement along the AD curve. Aggregate production
declines and the resulting lack of aggregate supply at an unchanged level of aggre-
gate demand leads to an increase in prices. Since negative supply shocks are often
associated with unexpected increases in factor prices pushing up production costs,
short run inﬂation of such a form is also called cost-push inﬂation. Thus in the
case of demand pull inﬂation an economy experiences a boom with growth rates
above trend, whereas in the case of cost push inﬂation the economy ends up in a
situation of both high inﬂation and low economic activity, commonly denoted as
stagﬂation.
Looking at equations (3.1) to (3.4) helps identifying the particular reasons for
demand pull or cost push inﬂation. An inspection of equation (3.3) shows that de-
mand pull inﬂation may have various sources, including an increase in the nominal
money supply, a positive IS shock or a negative LM shock. Cost push inﬂation in
turn is just triggered by one factor, that is the supply shock term st.
Finally equations (3.3) and (3.4) also demonstrate the output neutrality of antic-
ipated inﬂation: If economic agents expect higher future inﬂation rates, both the
AD and the short run AS curve will shift upwards (point C in Figure 3.3), thus
causing an increase in the actual inﬂation rate, but no (substantial) changes in
real output11.
After this brief summary of the most important inﬂation-related facts, the remain-
ing sections of this thesis will now address the theoretical rationale for central bank
independence and monetary conservatism, starting with a detailed explanation of
what is generally understood as the inﬂation bias.
11Note that in this model the net eﬀect of an increase in expected inﬂation on real output is
only zero if αβαγ+β = δ holds.
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4 The Inflation Bias and monetary policy
The analysis so far suggests two ﬁndings: First, inﬂation is generally harmful to
an economy (or at least strongly disliked by the general public) and second, the
ultimate cause determining long run inﬂation is nominal money growth. In the
light of these two results it would just seem logical to assume that governments
and central banks around the world continuously monitor the growth rate of their
nominal money supply in order to stabilize core inﬂation at a socially optimal low
level. However, though the tight connection between nominal money growth and
(long run) inﬂation is at least since the formulation of the quantity theory of money
a well established fact, until the 1980s there could be observed ineﬃciently high
growth rates of the nominal money supply which consequently also lead to exces-
sive average inﬂation rates (Barro and Gordon, 1982b). Economists, confronted
with this apparently illogical behavior of central bankers, were therefore searching
for possible reasons which might justify this antagonism between theory and prac-
tice. One admittedly very tempting explanation was to simply consider politics as
irrational (Barro and Gordon, 1983b, p. 590, Fn. 2). However, accepting such an
explanation would obviously make any systematic examination of governmental
behavior virtually impossible. If one therefore precludes irrationality as the reason
for ineﬃciently high inﬂation rates, printing money for public ﬁnance purposes,
that is seignorage, would serve as another potential explanation. However, though
seignorage could be a reasonable explication for high average inﬂation rates or
hyperinﬂation periods in developing countries, it was unable to justify excessive
inﬂation rates in developed countries, where money creation did not constitute a
(major) source of revenues (Romer, 2006, p. 506).
Therefore in the late 1970s and early 1980s several economists began to develop
a new game-theoretic framework for modeling monetary policy, which aimed at
reasoning the seemingly irrational behavior of real world monetary authorities.
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The core result in this new framework was that even though committing to a low
inﬂation rate principally constitutes the socially optimal strategy, in the absence
of a strong enforcement mechanism such a commitment will turn out to be time-
inconsistent, with the eﬀect that even benevolent governments will be tempted to
create too much inﬂation.
In the following I will present this game-theoretic framework in greater detail,
basing my explanations on the seminal papers of Kydland and Prescott and Barro
and Gordon (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and Barro and Gordon, 1983a,b).
In order to ﬁt my derivation into a well structured framework, I will ﬁrst start with
a brief explanation of the two main theoretical concepts of conducting monetary
policy.
4.1 The conduct of monetary policy: Rules versus discretion
When deciding upon the nature of his monetary strategy, a policymaker faces two
options: He can either reoptimize his monetary policy in every period anew, or
he can commit himself ex ante to a certain monetary policy rule. In the ﬁrst case
one speaks of a discretionary strategy, whereas the second case corresponds to a
policy strategy under commitment (Dwyer Jr., 1993).
The meaning of a discretionary strategy is quite straightforward. Under discretion
a policymaker is completely free in the choice of his monetary policy and thus
selects -conditional on his current information set- in every period that monetary
policy which he views as most appropriate to reach his policy goals. Committing
to a monetary policy rule in turn obviously means in the ﬁrst place restricting this
discretion of the policymaker. Such limitations can take various forms. One of
the most prominent rules in economics literature is the money growth rate rule
suggested by Classicals or Monetarists (see for example Friedman, 1960 or Lucas,
1980). Since inﬂation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon, this rule aims at
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implementing low core inﬂation rates via a strict control of the growth rate of
the nominal money supply. Other possible monetary rules which also ultimately
aim at low inﬂation are for instance a commitment to a constant price level (e.g.
Simons, 1936) or to a constant monetary base (Wallace, 1977).
However, since the long run relation between money growth and inﬂation is any-
way conventional wisdom, the key question hence has to be why a policymaker
should ever commit to a monetary rule, since such a commitment also clearly
restricts his ability to counteract economic shocks. Until the mid 1970s a large
group of economists thus supported the idea that a policy rule could never im-
prove upon discretion (Turnovsky, 1977). The main argument against rules was
that a benevolent policymaker acting under discretion could per deﬁnition execute
any monetary strategy suggested by a policy rule, but would still dispose over
the additional ability to react to unforeseeable economic disturbances (Dwyer Jr,
1993). However, supporters of monetary rules such as Milton Friedman opposed
this view by arguing that an activist monetary policy entails long and variable lags
in its eﬀects, causing that an intented countercyclical monetary policy will most
likely end up in a procyclical policy, thus amplifying economic distortions instead
of smoothing them.
The new game theoretic approach of modeling monetary policy based on Kyd-
land and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983b) substantially altered this
ongoing discussion. Though also in these models rules dominate discretion, the
underlying arguments are quite diﬀerent from the ones used by Friedman, as the
following two sections will show.
4.2 Monetary Policy as a non-cooperative game
Until the late 1970s proponents of a monetary rule mainly used natural rate AS/AD
models with rational expectations for the determination of optimal monetary pol-
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icy (see for example Sargent andWallace, 1975). The choice of the optimal strategy
was made over a range of prespeciﬁed monetary rules, where research focused upon
the question which of these rules yielded the lowest long run inﬂation rate. Clearly
such a setup triggered that discretion as a policy strategy had been excluded ex
ante, with crucial implications on the formation of policy expectations. Since in
these models agents had no reason to assume a deviation of the monetary author-
ity once the policy strategy had been implemented, any chosen monetary strategy
also automatically constituted a rational expectations equilibrium. In these mod-
els equality between private expectations and the policymaker's strategy had thus
been imposed as a prior constraint.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) were the ﬁrst to argue that such a framework is
inappropriate to describe real world monetary policy. In reality monetary policy
is not chosen once and for all (as the above framework implies), but rather on an
ongoing basis. Consequently they suggested that also theoretical models should
permit for sequential policy choices. However, allowing the policymaker to re-
optimize in every period clearly implies that (unexpected) monetary policy does
have real implications, which thus would justify discretionary acting as a plausible
policy strategy. Using a simple model with sequentially chosen policy, Kydland
and Prescott (1977) proofed that monetary commitment does dominate discretion
in principle, since by following a predeﬁned monetary rule a policymaker also ac-
tively inﬂuences expectations of future inﬂation rates. However, whenever there
exist temptations for the policymaker to create surprise inﬂation, in the absence of
an exogenous mechanism enforcing the monetary rule, such a commitment will not
be time consistent and can therefore not constitute a stable rational expectations
equilibrium.
Barro and Gordon (1983b) adapted and reﬁned these ideas of Kydland and Prescott
within a Phillips curve model. In their inﬂuential paper the process of executing
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monetary policy is described as a non-cooperative game played between the policy-
maker and rational economic agents. Any equilibrium in this game has to include
the following features (see Barro and Gordon, 1983b, p. 591):
1) a decision rule for private agents which determines their actions as a function
of their current information set,
2) an expectations function which determines the expectations of private agents
as a function of their current information set, and
3) a policy rule which speciﬁes the behavior of policy instruments as a function of
the policymaker's current information set.
For an equilibrium to further constitute a rational expectations Nash equilibrium,
additionally both of the following two conditions have to be met:
 First, the decision rule outlined in 1) has to be optimal for agents given their
expectations as formulated in 2) and
 Second, for the policymaker described in 3) it has to be optimal to perform
in accordance with the agents' expectations function 2), given that he knows
about the decision rule of private agents speciﬁed under 1).
Conditional on monetary policy being chosen sequentially, equality of policy ex-
pectations and actual chosen policy in this setup is then a characteristic of the
equilibrium, and no longer a prior constraint.
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Using this framework, Barro and Gordon showed that governmental-conducted
monetary policy is likely to cause an inﬂation bias, such that trend inﬂation at the
long run equilibrium will be ineﬃciently high. Since understanding the evolution
of this inﬂation bias is crucial for the topic of this thesis, the remaining part of
Section 4 will thus focus on its detailed explanation, where Section 4.3 will ﬁrst
provide a verbal intuitive explication, and Sections 4.4 to 4.6.1 a formal derivation
within a simple macro model.
4.3 Time inconsistency and the inflation bias
The line of argumentation which Barro and Gordon used to justify the existence of
an inﬂation bias may be best understood within the context of a simple example:
Assume an economy governed by a benevolent rational policymaker, whose aim
is to maximize social welfare in every period via an adequate choice of mone-
tary policy. As pointed out in Section 4.1, this policymaker can either act in a
discretionary way, or he can commit himself to a preannounced monetary rule.
However, since the policymaker will not be subject to any higher control instance,
it will ultimately depend upon himself whether he sticks to any self-imposed rule
or whether he decides to deviate.
Now suppose that in some period t the policymaker commits to a monetary policy
rule, which aims at establishing the socially optimal inﬂation rate from period t
onwards via an appropriate use of monetary instruments. Further assume that
private agents believe this commitment and thus set current economic decisions in
accordance with expecting this socially optimal (low) inﬂation rate in the future.
Since monetary policy is chosen sequentially, in period t+1 the benevolent policy-
maker principally faces two options: He can either follow the preannounced policy
rule and thus implement the socially optimal inﬂation rate, or he can deviate from
his rule and implement a diﬀerent inﬂation rate. Relying on the argumentation in
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Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon proved that, given that private
agents expect the monetary rule, it will always be optimal for the policymaker
to deviate from his preannounced rule and create an inﬂation rate higher than
expected. The reason is the following: Since in period t+ 1 period t prices as well
as period t expectations are history, the policymaker will also treat them as exoge-
nous when solving his period t+1 optimization problem. Given that private agents
expect the socially optimal inﬂation rate, a policymaker will thus be confronted
with the temptation to create surprise inﬂation (for the reasons outlined in Section
2.3.3). Since in the case of low inﬂation expectations the marginal social costs of
creating surprise inﬂation are approximately zero, whereas the marginal gains are
clearly positive, the policymaker will exploit this situation and will inﬂate beyond
expectations.
However, this implies that any rational, forward looking economic agent will cer-
tainly not expect the policymaker to follow an optimal monetary rule, meaning
that such a monetary policy rule can never constitute a stable rational expecta-
tions equilibrium. Policy commitment is thus a time inconsistent strategy. Fur-
thermore, in the long run (when agents have gathered suﬃcient information to
understand the policymaker's optimization problem) rational agents will rather
expect the policymaker to create unexpected inﬂation up to that level at which
the marginal gains of creating additional inﬂation are exactly outweighted by the
marginal costs. Accordingly they will anticipate such a high level of core inﬂation
already in advance. Since a benevolent policymaker, faced with such high inﬂa-
tion expectations, can not do any better than actually inﬂating up to the expected
level, under sequentially chosen monetary policy the only stable rational expecta-
tions equilibrium is characterized by an upwards biased core inﬂation rate, or put
diﬀerently, by a long run inﬂation rate which includes an inﬂation bias.
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4.4 A simple model of the inflation bias
The approach of verifying this intuitive explanation also in a formal way will be
the following: First the model economy will be sketched, which will be geared to
the simple stochastic AS/AD model in Rogoﬀ (1985). As a second step the optimal
monetary rule under commitment will be derived. This derivation will be made
subject to the condition that there exists an exogenous enforcement mechanism
which prevents the policymaker from deviating. Next relaxing this condition will
demonstrate that without such a mechanism committing to a monetary rule con-
stitutes a time inconsistent strategy. Consequently, since the implementation of
a monetary rule is infeasible, ﬁnally equilibrium under discretion will be derived,
where it will be shown that the prevailing core inﬂation rate will be biased up-
wards.
Following the approach laid out in Barro and Gordon (1983b), the model setup
will assume two players: A benevolent policymaker, who wants to maximize social
utility by choosing the best possible monetary strategy, and a large group of work-
ers, who -engaging in wage negotiations- seek to prevent themselves from real wage
reductions caused by surprise inﬂation. Concerning notation, target values of the
policymaker will be marked with a tilde, whereas the optimal values of the workers
will wear a bar. Additionally, lower case letters will denote natural logarithms and
all appearing coeﬃcients will be assumed to be positive.
4.4.1 The private sector
There exists a large number of identical ﬁrms in the economy, which produce
only one single good, y, using a Cobb-Douglas production function. Aggregate
production in period t thus is:
yt = c0 + αkˆ + (1− α)nt + zt, (4.1)
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where c0 is a constant term, kˆ is a ﬁxed capital stock, n is labor and z is a stochastic
productivity shock, with z ∼N(0,σ2z).
Supply of labor nst is given by a function increasing in the real wage
nst = n¯+ ω(wt − pt), (4.2)
with wt being the nominal wage rate, pt the price level and ω the marginal reaction
of labor supply to changes in the real wage12.
Wage negotiations over the nominal wage rate wt will be conducted on a ﬁrm-
by-ﬁrm basis at the end of period t − 1, which will create a short run rigidity in
nominal wages. It will furthermore be assumed that workers contractually agree
to provide whatever amount of labor is being demanded by the ﬁrms, given that
the negotiated nominal renumeration w¯t is being paid. Obviously this causes that
actual period t employment is uniquely demand side determined.
Next, ﬁrms in this economy will hire additional workers until the marginal product
of labor equals the (logarithmic) real wage, denoted as w¯t − pt. Labor demand,
and consequently actual employment in period t then is
ndt = nt = n¯+
(pt − w¯t)
α
+
zt
α
. (4.3)
At wage negotiations, the wage setters13 will choose a base wage rate, w¯t, which
minimizes Et−1(nt − n¯′t)2, where Et−1 is the rational expectations operator based
on period t − 1 information, nt is the actual employment rate as formulated in
equation (4.3) and n¯′t describes the employment level which would arise if base
wage rates could be negotiated after observing all relevant period t information,
12In order to simplify algebra n¯ = kˆ+ 1α [log(1−α)+c0] will be assumed (at no loss of generality).
13That is employers and workers' representatives involved into a ﬁrm's wage negotiation process.
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especially the monetary policy of the policymaker and the productivity shock zt.
The expression n¯′t can be found by combining (4.2) with the marginal product of
labor:
n¯′t = n¯+
ωzt
1 + αω
. (4.4)
Next, nt − n¯′t equals
nt − n¯′t =
zt
η
+
(pt − w¯t)
α
, (4.5)
with η ≡ α(1 + ωα).
Using (4.5) in order to minimize Et−1(nt− n¯′t)2 with respect to w¯t ﬁnally gives the
general decision rule for the base wage rate in period t:
w¯At = Et−1(pt), (4.6)
where the superscript A indicates that equation (4.6) deﬁnes the decision rule of
the wage setters under any arbitrary policy regime14.
4.4.2 The policymaker
The benevolent rational policymaker will have perfect information in every pe-
riod and will try to implement a monetary policy which maximizes social welfare
by minimizing deviations of both employment and inﬂation from their respective
socially optimal values.
14The result that wage setters target a logarithmic real wage of zero is due to the speciﬁcation
of n¯.
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This goal will be formalized in a quadratic period social loss function of the fol-
lowing form15:
Lt(pit, nt, p˜i, n˜
′
t, χ) = (nt − n˜′t)2 + χ(pit − p˜i)2 (4.7)
with pit = pt − pt−1.
Here n˜′t is the socially optimal employment rate (that is the employment rate which
the policymaker actually targets after obtaining all relevant period t information,
including the realization of the shock variables), p˜i is the socially optimal inﬂa-
tion rate16 and χ describes the weight which society, and consequently also the
policymaker, attaches to employment stabilization versus inﬂation stabilization.
The quadratic form of the social loss function does not only facilitate computa-
tions considerably, but also illustrates that social costs of inﬂation and employment
ﬂuctuations are said to be increasing in their amplitude. In order to create activist
monetary policy, the period t labor market equilibrium, n¯′t, will just be of a second
best form (due to labor market distortions), meaning that the socially optimal
(that is the ﬁrst best) level of employment, n˜′t, is located above this distorted nat-
ural rate17. Arguments justifying the assumption of a distorted labor market are
for example high income taxation, excessive unemployment beneﬁts or high legal
minimum wages. The removal of all of these labor market distortions, which would
consequently also eliminate the inﬂation bias and implement a ﬁrst best equilib-
rium, does not constitute a feasible strategy in this model, which means that at
15The main results would also hold if one assumes a multiperiod loss function (Rogoﬀ, 1985).
16The determination of the optimal level of inﬂation in an economy is not a subject of this thesis.
However, current research suggests that this rate should be both a low single digit number
and well above zero (see for example Fischer, 1996).
17To simplify calculations, it is assumed that the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the second best
employment level remains constant over time and equals n˜− n¯.
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most a second best equilibrium can be reached18. However, since the policymaker
targets the ﬁrst best employment rate, he will exploit the short run rigidity in
nominal wages and will create surprise inﬂation in order to temporary lower real
wages. Since these real wage reductions will also decrease real labor costs, such
an activist monetary policy pushes employment temporary closer to the ﬁrst best
level and thus improves social welfare.
Turning back to the policymaker's loss function, it will for simplicity be assumed
that the government conducts monetary policy via directly choosing the current
price level pt. Accordingly, for the derivation of the equilibrium strategies under
any monetary regime, one ﬁrst has to express the policymaker's loss function (4.7)
in terms of the decision variable of the policymaker, pt:
LAt = (
zt
η
+
(pt − w¯t)
α
− (n˜− n¯))2 + χ (pt − pt−1 − p˜i)2 , (4.8)
where (4.8) is obtained by plugging (4.5) into (4.7) and using the fact that n˜′t−n¯′t =
n˜ − n¯. The superscript A again indicates that (4.8) deﬁnes the policymaker's
loss function under any arbitrary policy regime. Equation (4.8) is one of the
central equations in this formal part of my thesis, since all derivations of monetary
policy regimes as well as their welfare evaluations will basically departure from
this expression.
18For arguments justifying the infeasibility of the ﬁrst best equilibrium see Section A.1 in the
appendix.
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4.5 Equilibrium under commitment
The ﬁrst regime under consideration is commitment to an optimal monetary rule,
where I assume that only simple rules are feasible19. As already mentioned, this
derivation will suppose the existence of an exogenous enforcement mechanism
which will prevent the policymaker from deviating. The process of choosing the
optimal policy under commitment can thus be viewed as equivalent to the once-
and-for-all selection of the optimal monetary rule in natural rate models such as in
Sargent and Wallace (1975). Like in these models, the ex-ante exclusion of discre-
tion causes that the independence of policy expectations and policy realizations is
broken up and therefore any chosen monetary strategy constitutes a stable rational
expectations equilibrium. In the context of the presented model setup this implies
that due to the commitment mechanism expectations over the period t price level,
Et−1pt, always have to coincide with the actual realized price level, pt (Barro and
Gordon, 1983b, p. 597). Substituting the general decision rule of the wage setters
(4.6) into the policymaker's loss function (4.8), the optimization problem under
commitment, indicated with a superscripted R for rule, then is:
min
pt
LRt = (
zt
η
+
(pt − Et−1pt)
α
− (n˜− n¯))2 + χ (pt − pt−1 − p˜i)2 . (4.9)
s.t. Et−1pt = pt.
Next using the prior constraint Et−1pt = pt in (4.9) shows that the second term in
19This assumption follows the argumentation in Rogoﬀ (1985) or Lohmann (1992) who point out
that the formulation of a state-contingent rule (a rule which would also account for economic
shocks) involves serious problems both in its formulation and its legislation. However, other
authors, such as Lockwood et al. (1995) or Svensson (1995) also view state contingent feedback
rules as feasible.
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the ﬁrst bracket cancels out entirely and the actual minimization problem of the
policymaker reduces to
min
pt
LRt = (
zt
η
− (n˜− n¯))2 + χ (pt − pt−1 − p˜i)2 . (4.10)
As equation (4.10) shows, the exogenous commitment mechanism prevents the
policymaker from exploiting the short run Phillips curve trade-oﬀ and restricts
him to consider only the direct welfare implications of inﬂation in his optimization
problem.
In order to get the optimal rule under policy commitment, ﬁrst diﬀerentiate (4.10)
with respect to pt which gives
∂LRt
∂pt
= 2χ(pt − pt−1 − p˜i). (4.11)
Setting this ﬁrst order condition equal to zero and solving for pt yields the optimal
monetary rule under commitment20 :
pRt = pt−1 + p˜i. (4.12)
The intuition behind equation (4.12) is straight forward: Since the policymaker
disposes over perfect control of the price level, in order to implement the socially
optimal inﬂation rate he will simply increase this price level in every period at a
rate equal to p˜i. Since policy deviation is an infeasible strategy, wage setters will
20The second order condition for a minimum is fulﬁlled, that is
∂2LRt
∂2pt
> 0.
31
believe the commitment of the policymaker and will accordingly set their nominal
base wage claims equal to
w¯Rt = Et−1(p
R
t ) = pt−1 + p˜i. (4.13)
Note that the three necessary equilibrium conditions as imposed in Section 4.2 are
already fulﬁlled: We have a policyrule for the policymaker, (4.12), and a decision
rule for wage setters, (4.13), which -due to the model speciﬁcations- coincides with
the private expectations function. Furthermore since the enforcement mechanism
precludes deviations of the policymaker, this set of strategies also has to constitute
a stable rational expectations equilibrium.
As a result, condition on the existence of a credible commitment mechanism, the
optimal monetary rule manages to implement a second best equilibrium, at which
labor markets are still distorted but inﬂation rates always equal their socially
optimal level.
4.5.1 Evaluating the social costs under commitment
Since the diﬀerent monetary policy regimes, which will be considered later in this
thesis, can hardly be compared in a direct way, I will thus use the expected social
losses at each of these regimes as a common reference value for their performance21.
These expected social losses will be calculated by plugging the respective equilib-
rium strategies of the players as well as the equilibrium inﬂation rate into the
generalized social loss function (4.8) and taking t− 1 expectations over this func-
tion.
Applying this method to calculate the expected social losses under commitment, I
21I will use the expected rather than the actual social losses for comparisons, since the actual
period t losses also depend upon the stochastic supply shock term zt.
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thus plug the policy rule (4.12), the decision rule (4.13) and the realized long run
inﬂation rate (which equals the socially optimal inﬂation rate p˜i) into the general
social loss function (4.8), which gives an expression for the actual period t social
losses:
LRt = (
zt
η
+
(pt−1 + p˜i − pt−1 − p˜i)
α
− (n˜− n¯))2 + χ (p˜i − p˜i)2 . (4.14)
Taking t − 1 expectations over (4.14) and additionally simplifying the expression
gives the expected social losses under commitment22:
Et−1(LRt ) = (n˜− n¯)2 +
σ2z
η2
. (4.15)
Equation (4.15) shows that these expected social losses basically depend on two
factors: First, on the degree of labor market ineﬃciencies (the diﬀerence between
the distorted labor market equilibrium n¯ and the ﬁrst best equilibrium n˜), and
second on the variance of the supply shock term, σ2z . Since losses due to labor
market ineﬃciencies are regime-independent, the actual, regime-dependent losses
of commitment boil down to the obvious inability of the policymaker to counteract
economic disturbances. For the sake of stable inﬂation the monetary authority
will accept socially costly ﬂuctuations in employment, as the second term in (4.15)
illustrates.
4.5.2 The issue of time inconsistency
However, if one precludes the existence of an exogenous enforcement mechanism,
commitment to an optimal monetary rule does no longer constitute a stable ra-
22Note that Et−1(z2t ) = σ
2
z .
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tional expectations equilibrium. The following calculations shall now demonstrate
this issue also formally.
According to its deﬁnition, in a Nash equilibrium the strategies chosen by every
player have to constitute a best response, given the strategies of the respective
other players. In order to check whether the commitment strategies (4.12) and
(4.13) still form a stable Nash equilibrium, one therefore has to verify whether
these strategies are still mutual best responses. In the case of the wage setters
the answer is straight forward: Since their general decision rule (4.6) always in-
corporates the policy rule of the policymaker, (4.13) still has to constitute a best
response to the policy rule (4.12). Next, in order to test whether also the policy
rule of the policymaker still constitutes a best response to the decision rule of the
wage setters, rewrite the optimization problem of the policymaker and substitute
the wage setters' decision rule (4.13) into the loss function of the policymaker (4.8),
min
pt
LDevt = (
zt
η
+
pt − (pt−1 + p˜i)
α
− (n˜− n¯))2 + χ (pt − pt−1 − p˜i)2 . (4.16)
The policymaker, who is now no longer constrained to implement an inﬂation rate
equal to expected inﬂation, will solve the above minimization problem and will
select a price level equal to
pDevt = pt−1 + p˜i +
α
1 + α2χ
(
(n˜− n¯)− zt
η
)
. (4.17)
Obviously (4.17) diﬀers from the preannounced optimal rule (4.12). Having a
closer look at (4.17) shows that the reasons for this deviation are twofold: First,
given that wage setters have expected a low inﬂation rate, the benevolent policy-
maker will be tempted to exploit these expectations and stimulate the economy
via surprise inﬂation; second, since the policymaker is no longer bounded to create
the socially optimal inﬂation rate at all costs, he will choose to partly accommo-
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date supply shocks in order to reduce large employment ﬂuctuations at the costs
of some ﬂuctuations in inﬂation.
Thus, the commitment policy rule (4.12) no longer constitutes a best response to
the commitment wage setters rule (4.13) and consequently, in the absence of an
exogenous enforcement mechanism, these commitment strategies cannot form a
stable rational expectations equilibrium.
4.6 Equilibrium under discretion
Since policy commitment is a time inconsistent strategy, this section will now
turn to the second way of executing monetary policy, i.e. discretion. In order to
derive the equilibrium strategies under discretion I will ﬁrst determine the optimal
monetary strategy of the discretionary policymaker for any given strategy of the
wage setters, that is for any value of w¯t. Since discretionary policy per deﬁnition
corresponds with sequential optimization, the policymaker will -after observing the
productivity shock zt- determine his optimal monetary strategy in every period by
diﬀerentiating (4.8) with respect to pt, which gives
∂LD
∂pt
=
2
α
(
zt
η
+
(pt − w¯t)
α
− (n˜− n¯)
)
2
α
χ(pt − pt−1 − p˜i). (4.18)
Setting (4.18) equal to zero and rearranging yields a best response function of the
policymaker for any arbitrary realization of w¯t
23:
pDt =
1
1 + α2χ
(
α2χ(pt−1 + p˜i) + w¯t + α(n˜− n¯− zt
η
)
)
. (4.19)
23Again the necessary second order conditions for a minimum are fulﬁlled.
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Wage setters in turn will understand the policymaker's optimization problem in
the long run and will consequently choose a nominal base wage rate at a suﬃciently
high level, such that in the absence of economic shocks the policymaker has no
incentive to further inﬂate beyond expectations24. In order to get this decision
rule of the wage setters ﬁrst take t− 1 expectations across (4.19):
Et−1(pDt ) =
1
1 + α2χ
(
α2χ(pt−1 + p˜i) + w¯t + α(n˜− n¯)
)
. (4.20)
In a second step substitute the general decision rule (4.6) for w¯t in (4.20) and solve
the expression for w¯t. The decision rule of the wage setters under discretion is:
w¯Dt = Et−1(p
D
t ) = pt−1 + p˜i +
(n˜− n¯)
χα
. (4.21)
Finally plugging (4.21) back into (4.19) gives the equilibrium policy rule of the
discretionary policymaker:
pDt = pt−1 + p˜i +
(n˜− n¯)
χα
− α
1 + α2χ
zt
η
. (4.22)
As in the commitment case also here equation (4.22) and (4.21) already constitute
the three equations necessary for the existence of an equilibrium. In order to check
whether (4.22) and (4.21) also constitute a rational expectations Nash equilibrium,
once again both strategies have to constitute best responses to each other. Since
the policymaker incorporates the decision rule of private agents into his optimiza-
tion problem (w¯t forms part of equation (4.8)), the resulting policy rule (4.22) has
to be a best response to (4.21). Also the decision rule of private agents is a best
24Note that though also individual wage setters dislike inﬂation, they do not have any incentive
to change their equilibrium behavior, since their individual labor contract has only a marginal
impact on the aggregate inﬂation rate.
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response, since by employing their general decision rule (4.6), they also incorpo-
rate the policy rule of the policymaker into their decision process. Accordingly
equations (4.22) and (4.21) together also form a stable rational expectations Nash
equilibrium.
Finally in order to show that long run inﬂation under discretion is biased upwards,
subtract pt−1 from equation (4.21), which gives the expected inﬂation rate under
discretion (which in equilibrium equals trend inﬂation, see equation (3.5) in Section
3.2.1):
p¯iD = p˜i +
(n˜− n¯)
χα
. (4.23)
As equation (4.23) shows, at the discretionary equilibrium trend inﬂation will be
systematically too high. A more detailed inspection of (4.23) displays that long
run inﬂation under discretion equals the socially optimal inﬂation rate, p˜i, plus an
inﬂation bias (n˜−n¯)
χα
. This bias is caused by the short run attempts of the policy-
maker to improve social welfare via activist monetary policy and is increasing in
the degree of labor market ineﬃciencies, measured by (n˜ − n¯).tion of (4.23) dis-
plays that long run inﬂation under discretion equals the socially optimal inﬂation
rate, p˜i, plus an inﬂation bias (n˜−n¯)
χα
. This bias is caused by the short run attempts
of the policymaker to improve social welfare via activist monetary policy and is
increasing in the degree of labor market ineﬃciencies, measured by (n˜− n¯).
4.6.1 Evaluation of the social costs under discretion
Following the structure of Section 4.5, also here I will conclude the derivation of
the discretionary outcome with the evaluation of the expected social costs under
discretion. However, contrast to Section 4.5.1 here I will not directly calculate
the expected social costs, but I will rather follow the approach in Rogoﬀ (1985)
and ﬁrst develop a general notation for expected social losses under any arbitrary
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monetary policy regime. This generalized notation decomposes the expected social
losses according to their respective origins, which will turn out to be helpful later
on, when possible improvements upon the discretionary outcome will be consid-
ered. Deﬁning ΛAt as Et−1(L
A
t ) this general expected social loss function is of the
following form,
ΛAt = (n˜− n¯)2 + χΠA + ΓA, (4.24)
with ΠA ≡ (p¯iA− p˜i)2 and ΓA ≡ Et−1
{[
zt
η
+
(pAt −Et−1(pAt )
α
]2
+ χ
[
pAt − Et−1(pAt )
]2}
.
Here pAt deﬁnes the policymaker's decision rule under an arbitrary monetary regime
and p¯iA marks the long run inﬂation rate occurring under that regime25.
A more detailed look at ΛAt discloses the diﬀerent roots of social costs: The ﬁrst
term for example shows the dead weight loss caused by labor market imperfections.
This term is both non stochastic and invariant across any chosen policy regime.
The second term measures the diﬀerence between the long run inﬂation rate and
the socially optimal target rate. It is thus also non-stochastic, but does depend
on the chosen regime. The last term ﬁnally deﬁnes the stabilization part. It
measures up to which degree the policymaker manages to oﬀset short run inﬂation
caused by economic disturbances. Importantly note that stabilization here refers to
minimizing ﬂuctuation of employment and inﬂation around their long run market
determined values, and not around their socially optimal values.
Since the long run trend inﬂation under discretion has already been determined
(see equation (4.23)), ΠD can already be calculated and there remains only ΓD
left for determination. In order to calculate the stabilization costs of standard
discretionary policy, one ﬁrst has to derive the price level forecast error which the
discretionary policymaker permits to occur in order to stabilize employment. This
25The exact formal derivation of (4.24) can be looked up in Section A.2 in the appendix.
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prediction error equals the actual minus the expected period t price level and can
hence be calculated using equations (4.21) and (4.22):
pDt − Et−1(pDt ) = −
zt
η
(
α
1 + α2χ
)
. (4.25)
Since in the case of cost push inﬂation employment and inﬂation move into opposite
directions, a stabilization conﬂict arises and the policymaker therefore permits for
some ﬂuctuations in inﬂation for the sake of employment stabilization26.
By using (4.25) in ΓA as well as (4.23) in ΠA ﬁnally the overall expected social
losses under discretion are obtained
ΛDt = Et−1L
D
t = (n˜− n¯)2 +
(n˜− n¯)2
α2χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠD
+
σ2z
η2
α2χ
(1 + α2χ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓD
. (4.26)
Comparing these expected social losses under discretion (equation (4.26)) with the
expected social losses under commitment (equation (4.15)) shows that in a pre-
dominant number of cases discretion will cause a larger decrease of social welfare
than a regime with policy commitment27. Thus, though there exists a stable equi-
librium under discretion, the resulting outcome is certainly not socially optimal,
such that the logical next step clearly is to consider ways out of this bad equilib-
rium under discretion and search for methods to bring social welfare closer to its
second best value under commitment.
26The reason why demand shocks do not play any role throughout this thesis is simple. Since
in the case of an aggregate demand shock output and employment stabilization is consistent
with inﬂation stabilization, the perfectly informed policymaker will thus oﬀset any demand
shock with a corresponding monetary policy and consequently demand pull inﬂation can be
eliminated entirely.
27Section A.3 in the appendix derives the exact parameter conditions necessary for the dominance
of policy commitment over discretion.
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5 Monetary conservatism as a solution to improve upon
discretion
The publication of the Barro-Gordon model in 1983 clearly helped to better un-
derstand the ineﬃcient behavior of monetary authorities, since it provided a the-
oretical explanation why governments and central banks fail to implement low,
stable inﬂation rates. However, the contribution of this model mainly was to for-
malize an existing problem. Apart from suggesting trigger strategies in order to
improve upon discretion (which though do only work out in an inﬁnite horizon
model) the publications of Barro and Gordon on this topic did not suggest any
concept to overcome or at least reduce the inﬂation bias (see Barro and Gordon,
1983a,b). Therefore shortly after the publication of the Barro-Gordon model sev-
eral researchers started to focus upon theoretical methods to reduce the inﬂation
bias. Since policy commitment constitutes an infeasible strategy, these attempts
concentrated on methods to bring down long run inﬂation without impeding dis-
cretionary acting of the policymaker as such.
Since it is the activist monetary policy of the policymaker which at the end of
the day causes excessive high average inﬂation rates, all of the theoretical pro-
posals ﬁrst suggested to delegate monetary policy away from the government to
an independent central banker. However, such a delegation would remain with-
out any eﬀect if this central banker would still share the policymaker's preferences.
Therefore in all of the proposed solutions this independent central banker has been
attached with the task of minimizing a slightly diﬀerent social loss function, where
these modiﬁcations all aimed at making the central bank more inﬂation averse
than the government, i.e. monetary conservative.
In this section I will present the three most prominent theoretical proposals in this
area. The ﬁrst suggestion has been made by Rogoﬀ (1985), who has shown that
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the implementation of a weight conservative central banker, who puts a higher
weight on inﬂation stabilization than society does, can considerably reduce the
inﬂation bias. As already announced in the introduction, this theoretical concept
probably had the highest practical signiﬁcance for the observed wave of central
bank reforms, which is why also this thesis will mainly focus upon that theoretical
proposal. However, there still exist two other prominent theoretical suggestions to
combat the inﬂation bias, which are a target conservative central banker proposed
in Svensson (1995) and an independent central banker attached with a linear inﬂa-
tion contract, suggested in Walsh (1995)28. These two concept manage to eliminate
not just a part, but the entire inﬂation bias and are thus able to implement a sec-
ond best equilibrium. However, despite of their theoretical attractiveness they
both feature considerable drawbacks related to their practical implementability.
5.1 Weight conservatism: A conservative central banker
As already pointed out, the political changes which Rogoﬀ proposed are twofold:
First, monetary policy should be executed by an independent central banker and
not by the policymaker himself, and second, this independent central banker should
put more, but not inﬁnitely more weight on inﬂation stabilization than average
society does.
The following formal derivation will illustrate why such a setup is able to reduce
the inﬂation bias and improve social welfare.
Suppose that in period t−1 an agent is selected to head the central bank, who has
the reputation of being more inﬂation averse than society. Further assume that
28Strictly speaking the linear inﬂation contract does not fall into the category of monetary
conservatism, since in this concept the loss function as such does not change. Nevertheless,
for the sake of clarity it will also be presented within this section.
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this central banker will choose his optimal monetary policy strategy by minimizing
a slightly diﬀerent social loss function of the form
LBt = (nt − n˜t′)2 + (χ+ )(pit − p˜i)2, (5.1)
with  > 0.
Since the substitution of χ by (χ + ) constitutes the only change compared to
the discretionary case, also the algorithm for calculating the policy rule and the
decision rule is equivalent to Section 4.6. Therefore for the sake of brevity only
the results will be provided here:
pDt = pt−1 + p˜i +
(n˜− n¯)
(χ+ )α
− α
1 + α2(χ+ )
zt
η
, (5.2)
w¯Bt = Et−1(p
D
t ) = pt−1 + p˜i +
n˜− n¯
α(χ+ )
. (5.3)
Note that equations (5.2) and (5.3) also form a rational expectations equilibrium
according to the Barro-Gordon deﬁnition29, where the long run inﬂation estab-
lished at this equilibrium equals
p¯iB =
(n˜− n¯)
α(χ+ )
+ p˜i. (5.4)
A comparison of equations (4.23) and (5.4) shows that for an  > 0 trend inﬂation
can really be reduced compared to the discretionary case.
However, showing that weight conservatism reduces the average inﬂation bias alone
does not yet verify that the introduction of a conservative central banker also im-
proves social welfare. The reason therefore is the stabilization performance of the
29The proof is equivalent to the discretionary case and will therefore be omitted here.
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conservative central banker: Under discretion the policymaker oﬀsets economic
shocks in accordance with social preferences, that is in the best possible way. How-
ever, comparing (4.22) with (5.2) shows that under a conservative central banker
monetary responses to supply shocks are less pronounced than under discretion,
which implies that socially costly employment ﬂuctuations will increase. In order
to see this impact of weight conservatism on social welfare, calculate the expected
social loss function under an independent central banker, following again the same
procedure as derived in Section 4.6,
ΛBt = (n˜− n¯)2 +
(
(n˜− n¯)
α(χ+ )
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠB
+
σ2z
η2
(χ+ )2 + χ
α2
( 1
α
2
+ χ+ )2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓB
. (5.5)
Comparing (5.5) with the expected social loss function under discretion, (4.26),
shows that in the case of a conservative central banker, that is for  > 0, the
loss term capturing trend inﬂation, ΠB, has decreased, whereas the stabilization
term ΓB has increased. If a conservative central banker can really improve overall
social welfare, there thus has to exist an ∗, with 0 < ∗ < ∞, which minimizes
ΛBt and thus also reduces social losses compared to the discretionary case
30. In
order to verify this condition, I will follow the proof in Rogoﬀ (1985)31 and will
ﬁrst diﬀerentiate ΛB with respect to :
∂ΛBt
∂
= χ
∂ΠB
∂
+
∂ΓB
∂
, (5.6a)
∂ΠB
∂
= −2[(n˜− n¯)/α]
2
(χ+ )3
, (5.6b)
30Since the derivation of a closed form solution turns out to be highly complicated, in the
following just the existence of such an ∗ will be proven.
31Rogoﬀ, 1985, p. 1178.
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∂ΓB
∂
= 2
σ2z
η2
/α2
((1/α)2 + χ+ )3
. (5.6c)
Next note that, since  > 0 holds by assumption, (5.6b) shows that ∂Π
B
∂
is strictly
negative for every possible value of . Furthermore, an inspection of (5.6c) shows
that ∂Γ
B
∂
is zero for  = 0 and positive for  > 0. Hence, as a ﬁrst result
∂ΛBt
∂
has to
be negative at  = 0. However, for a suﬃciently large value of 
∂ΛBt
∂
must change
to positive, since as  approaches positive inﬁnity,
∂ΓBt
∂
will converge to zero at a
rate −2, whereas ∂Π
B
t
∂
will converge to zero at rate −3. So there has to exist some
positive ﬁnite value of ∗, at which ∂Λ
B
t
∂∗ = 0 holds and hence overall social losses
are minimized32.
The intuitive conclusion of this proof is the following: Raising  from 0 causes
that the central banker attaches more weight to inﬂation stabilization than soci-
ety does, which thus drives down the inﬂation bias (see equation (5.4)). However
reducing this bias comes at the costs of less ﬂexibility in reacting to unanticipated
economic shocks, which then triggers an increase in ΓB. In the neighborhood of
 = 0 the gains from inﬂation stabilization more than outweight the costs due
to higher employment ﬂuctuations. Equivalently as  becomes very large, the
marginal costs from reducing  a bit and accepting a slightly higher trend inﬂa-
tion rate are more than outweighted by the resulting stabilization gains. Finally,
at some value ∗, ∂Λ
B
t
∂∗ = 0 holds and the diﬀerence between social gains due to
reduced trend inﬂation and social losses caused by an increased stabilization bias
reaches its maximum.
As a result, the introduction of a conservative central banker does constitute both
a stable rational expectations equilibrium and an improvement compared to the
32Clearly this proof just shows that there is an extreme value at ∗. However, Rogoﬀ points
out that via some additional calculations it can be proven that at ∗ also the second order
condition for a minimum is fulﬁlled.
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discretionary case. Though weight conservatism can not eliminate the entire in-
ﬂation bias, its implementation still means a reduction in average inﬂation and an
overall improvement in social welfare33.
5.2 Theoretical proposals to eliminate the entire inflation bias
Having reviewed the concept of weight conservatism in greater detail, the next two
subsections will provide a brief summary of the two other prominent suggestions
of reducing the inﬂation bias under discretion. As already mentioned, though both
of these concepts manage to eliminate the entire inﬂation bias in theory, they do
face some notable drawbacks referring to their practical implementability.
5.2.1 Target conservatism: A conservative inflation target
The basic idea presented in Svensson (1995) is of striking simplicity. First, as in
Rogoﬀ (1985) also Svensson proposes that monetary policy should be delegated
to an independent central banker, who is attached with a modiﬁed social loss
function. However, in contrast to Rogoﬀ, Svensson does not change the relative
weight in this loss function, but rather alters the inﬂation target itself in order to
eliminate the inﬂation bias.
The proposed solution then works as follows: Since an inﬂation target equal to
the socially optimal rate yields a long run inﬂation equal to this rate plus an
33Since the reduction of the inﬂation bias under the conservative central banker comes at the
cost of higher employment volatility, some authors have argued that this concept might not
be optimal in the case of very large supply shocks. A suggestion to overcome this problem
has been made in Lohmann (1992), who proposes that the conservative central banker should
only be partly independent, such that in the presence of large shocks he can be overridden
by a discretionary government. In her setup this central banker will then choose a linear
combination of the conservative and the discretionary inﬂation rate whenever shocks exceed a
certain threshold, causing that the undesirable negative welfare implications of sharp changes
in the employment rate can be reduced.
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inﬂation bias, a more conservative target, which equals the socially optimal rate
minus this inﬂation bias should exactly produce the socially optimal inﬂation rate.
Implementing this inﬂation targeting concept of Svensson within the above model
setup means that the new conservative inﬂation target has to equal piT = p˜i− (n˜−n¯)
χα
.
Next note that since the model setup as such has not changed, the policymaker
is still following a discretionary policy. Consequently the formal derivation of the
decision- and the policy rule, as well as the proof for the existence of a rational
expectations equilibrium are equivalent to section 4.6. Therefore one can directly
see the eﬀect of a conservative inﬂation target by substituting piT for p˜i in the
expression for the long run inﬂation rate under discretion, equation (4.23):
p¯iTarget = p˜i. (5.7)
Equation (5.7) shows that with a conservative inﬂation target equal to piT the en-
tire inﬂationary bias can be oﬀset. Additionally, since the only change compared
to discretion is a lower target inﬂation rate, stabilization behavior is not aﬀected
and thus the discretionary policymaker still oﬀsets economic shocks in a socially
optimal way.
So at ﬁrst sight the proposed conservative inﬂation target seems to be an ele-
gant way to overcome the inﬂation bias and implement a second best equilibrium.
However, despite of this theoretical attractiveness Svensson's approach unfortu-
nately does feature some problematic issues concerning its practical implementa-
tion. First note that, since the actual target of the central bank is not the socially
optimal inﬂation rate but rather the more conservative inﬂation target piT , the
central bank still systematically misses its target. Svensson points out that this
issue should not be much of a problem, since also under discretion average inﬂa-
tion systematically exceeds the socially optimal level. However, inﬂation targeting
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and discretionary monetary policy diﬀer in one crucial point: If one understands
inﬂation targeting in its general perception, such a concept implies that the central
bank publicly announces to commit to a certain inﬂation target, whereas discre-
tion lacks of such a clear-cut commitment. Thus under an inﬂation targeting
regime public expectations of the central bank hitting its target are much more
pronounced than under discretion. If the central bank systematically misses this
target, it will suﬀer from a constant loss in credibility in the eyes of the general
public, which might lead to a point where people start to question the eﬀectiveness
of the targeting regime. The conclusion of Svensson (1995) also acknowledges this
issue, but counters that the general fail to reach the announced target then has to
be explained to the public as a necessary condition in order to oﬀset the inﬂation
bias. However, whether this issue could really be communicated to the general
public in a convincing way, has to be put into question.
5.2.2 A linear inflation contract
The second prominent suggestion to overcome excessive average inﬂation has been
put up in Walsh (1995). Also this theoretical concept manages to completely
eliminate the inﬂation bias, but like inﬂation targeting also this approach does
involve some practical drawbacks.
Again the ﬁrst step is to delegate monetary policy to an independent central
banker. Next, in order to prevent this central banker from creating an inﬂation
bias, Walsh adds an additional linear cost term (a linear inﬂation contract) to
the loss function in order to stronger penalize any positive deviation of inﬂation
from its socially optimal rate. The modiﬁed loss function of the central banker
consequently is
L(pit, nt, p˜i, n˜
′
t, χ) = (nt − n˜′t)2 + χ(pit − p˜i)2 + ρ(pit − p˜i). (5.8)
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In Walsh (1995) it is demonstrated that via an appropriate choice of ρ the inﬂation
bias arising under discretion can be eliminated entirely.
To show this concept again within the model setup employed so far, ρ has to be
chosen according to ρ = n˜−n¯
α
, which results in a social loss function (in terms of
pt) of the form
Lt = (
zt
η
+
(pt − w¯t)
α
− (n˜− n¯))2 +χ (pt − pt−1 − p˜i)2 + n˜− n¯
α
(pt−pt−1− p˜i). (5.9)
Calculating the policy rule and the decision rule of the trade union again according
to the theoretical scheme outlaid in section 4.6, it can be shown that the entire
inﬂation bias disappears in equilibrium and average inﬂation equals its socially
optimal level34. Thus, also the ﬁrst impression of a linear inﬂation contract is that
it constitutes an even better concept than the conservative central banker. How-
ever, a more detailed look reveals also here some practical and political problems
concerning the implementation (Svensson, 1995, p.14).
The practical problem is that the costs implied by the inﬂation contract are most
likely of a monetary nature, whereas the rest of the loss function describes costs in
utility terms. Thus monetary revenues of the central banker have to be translated
into utility terms before optimization can be carried out. The involved political
problems might even be of a more serious nature. Note that the formulation of
the linear inﬂation contract implies a negative renumeration, i.e. costs, to the
central banker whenever inﬂation lies above the socially optimal rate, but positive
monetary gains whenever actual inﬂation lies below this rate. Such a formula-
tion hence has the perverse eﬀect that in the case of a negative demand shock, at
which both inﬂation and economic activity are low, the wage of the central banker
34The proof for the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium is again equivalent to the
discretionary case above.
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would increase, an issue which would be hard to justify toward the general public.
Therefore also the practical relevance of this theoretical concept is questionable.
5.3 Theoretical limitations of the presented approaches
The above discussion has shown that there exist various theoretical approaches to
reduce or even eliminate the inﬂation bias, where the weight conservative central
banker by Rogoﬀ is probably the most inﬂuential suggestion among the three in-
troduced concepts35. However, though all of the presented proposals have certainly
contributed to the observed changes in central bank institutions, their theoretical
and practical signiﬁcance is still limited. These limitations take various forms:
One remarkable drawback constitutes the high degree of simpliﬁcation inherent
in these models. For example ﬁscal policy or public debt do not play any role
in the optimization process of the policymaker, though Section 2.3.3 has clearly
shown that also ﬁscal considerations can constitute a remarkable temptation for a
monetary authority to create surprise inﬂation. Furthermore, also the assumptions
concerning monetary instruments are a large abstraction of reality. In the frame-
works considered above the monetary authority disposes over perfect control of
the current price level, where changes in this price level in turn have an immediate
and well deﬁned impact on the model economy. In reality, however, central banks
are far from perfectly controlling the price level and also the impacts of monetary
policy are neither direct nor immediate. Finally, since all of the above concepts
have been elaborated within a standard Keynesian framework, they additionally
face the general disadvantages of all Keynesian models, most importantly the gen-
eral lack of micro-foundation.
35Section A.4 in the appendix once again summarizes in a graphical way the time-inconsistency
problem of the policymaker and the reduction of trend inﬂation via the introduction of a
conservative central banker.
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Because of these drawbacks, in the last section of my thesis I will sketch possi-
ble implications of monetary conservatism within modern micro-founded models,
which manage to overcome most of the previously mentioned disadvantages. More
precisely, I will introduce two recently published papers, which investigate the im-
plications of a Rogoﬀ weight conservative central banker in a model framework
with endogenous ﬁscal policy and public debt.
6 The conservative central banker in modern, micro based
model setups
Due to the previously mentioned drawbacks of traditional Keynesian setups, con-
temporary research increasingly considers time inconsistency problems in public
policies within modern general equilibrium frameworks. Ireland (1997) for exam-
ple basically replicates the results of the Barro-Gordon model within a dynamic
general equilibrium model with utility maximizing households, sticky prices and
monopolistic competition. However, though this approach accounts for the lack
of micro foundation, it still faces the drawback of completely abstracting from
ﬁscal policy. Another branch of literature has focused on time consistent ﬁscal
policy in dynamic general equilibrium models (Chari and Kehoe, 1990 or Klein
et. al., 2008). However, since these papers consider only time inconsistency prob-
lems of ﬁscal policy, money in general does not play any role. Additionally, these
models also abstract from public debt. Then there exists yet another strand of
literature, which investigates optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy, but which con-
siders commitment as feasible such that time inconsistency is excluded ex ante
(e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007 or Ferrero, 2005).
Only recently several papers have focused on the quite obvious problem of ﬁnd-
ing optimal time consistent ﬁscal and monetary policy strategies in setups where
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policy commitment is precluded, though such an arrangement seems to be a quite
realistic reﬂection from real world institutional setups. Díaz-Giménez et al. (2008)
and Martin (2009), for example, consider models, in which there is a dynamic
interaction between debt accumulation and inﬂation and where time inconsistency
evolves because of the policymaker's temptation to use surprise inﬂation in order
to reduce the real stock of public debt. However, nowhere in the above presented
literature the impacts of implementing some form of monetary conservatism have
been considered36.
In this context Adam and Billi (2008) and Niemann (2009) constitute a remarkable
exception. Both of these papers consider the most prominent version of monetary
conservatism -that is the weight conservative central banker- within a modern
macroeconomic setup, where Adam and Billi (2008) focus on the interaction be-
tween weight conservatism and endogenous ﬁscal policy, whereas Niemann (2009)
investigates the eﬀects of weight conservatism on endogenous public debt. The key
research question in both these papers is the same: Does a conservative central
banker still remain desirable within a micro-founded model framework, augmented
with endogenous ﬁscal policy and public debt?
In order to answer this question, in the following two subsections I will brieﬂy
summarize the model setups as well a the main results of both papers, where I
will put the main focus on the work by Niemann, since his model challenges the
the general result of a welfare-improving conservative central banker.
36One though may point out the paper by Lippi (2003), where a conservative central banker in
a micro-founded environment with non-atomistic wage setters is considered. However, Lippi
(2003) focuses entirely on the real implications of monetary conservatism and abstracts from
any costs of inﬂation.
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6.1 Weight conservatism and fiscal policy
6.1.1 The model setup
The employed model structure in Adam and Billi (2008) is a stochastic New-
Keynesian framework with monopolistic competition and sticky prices. The model
economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households which gain
utility from three sources: consumption of an aggregate consumption good, con-
sumption of a public good provided by the government, and leisure. Two distortive
factors enter the economy: First, aggregate production of the consumption good
is stochastic due to technology shocks, and second, also the degree of monopolistic
competition is subject to random shocks.
Households earn income in the form of proﬁts and wages and can use this income
either for consumption or for the purchase of one period government bonds, which
pay a gross nominal interest rate Rt in the next period. If ﬁrms want to change
the prices of their products, they face menu-costs in the form of a Rotemberg-type
quadratic resource cost term (see Rotemberg, 1982). Prices in the economy are
thus sticky and monetary policy has short run real eﬀects.
The government consists of two authorities: A ﬁscal policymaker and a monetary
policymaker. The ﬁscal policymaker's aim is to choose an optimal level of pub-
lic goods provision and ﬁnance this supply either via lump sum taxes or via the
issuance of government bonds. Due to the availability of lump sum taxes the gov-
ernment budget is balanced in every period, such that debt does not play any role
in the model. The monetary policymaker in turn sets in every period the optimal
level of the nominal interest rate paid on government bonds37. The goal of both
37Since the model abstracts from cash holdings, an Euler equation will ensure a direct mechanical
connection between the interest rate and inﬂation at the equilibrium.
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policymakers is to maximize social welfare, which in this case means to choose
that level of gt and Rt which maximizes household utility.
6.1.2 Equilibrium under sequential policies
Assuming lack of intertemporal commitment, equilibrium strategies have to be
sequentially optimal in order to constitute a stable Nash equilibrium. In their
analysis Adam and Billi restrict the set of feasible policy functions to Markov-
perfect strategies38. At the sequential policies equilibrium (SP equilibrium) the
strategies of both policymakers will dictate an activist policy, which at the end of
the day will result in having no real eﬀects. More precisely, the reaction functions
will indicate the selection of a level of government spending which is too high, and
a nominal interest rate which is too low compared to an optimal Ramsey outcome
under commitment. Since in this model the optimal inﬂation rate under policy
commitment is zero, these deviations will result in an inﬂationary pressure, leading
to an ineﬃciently high steady state inﬂation rate. The reasons for this seemingly
irrational behavior of public authorities are identical to the above presented Barro-
Gordon model. Since due to monopolistic competition aggregate output will be
ineﬃciently low, both policymakers will try to bring output at least temporary
closer to its ﬁrst best level, either via public spending (ﬁscal policymaker) or via
a reduction of the nominal interest rate (monetary policymaker). However, as in
the standard Barro-Gordon model, such a behavior will be anticipated by rational,
forward-looking households, such that this activist policy will have no real long
run eﬀects.
38Markov strategies are deﬁned as history-independent, time-invariant strategies, which deter-
mine current acting just as a function of current economic conditions.
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6.1.3 Welfare implications of a conservative central banker
In a next step Adam and Billi investigate equilibrium policy strategies under a
conservative central banker. Under monetary conservatism the ﬁscal policymaker
will still aim at maximizing household utility, whereas the monetary authority's
new objective will consist in maximizing a weighted sum of household utility and
a quadratic inﬂation loss term39. Since now the policy goals of both authorities
diﬀer, the timing of policy acting does become crucial. Therefore Adam and Billi
include both the Nash equilibrium as well as Stackelberg leadership equilibira in
their analysis. Their main results are the following:
In the case of simultaneous decision making (Nash equilibrium) and monetary
leadership the equilibrium inﬂation rate will decrease as the relative weight on
inﬂation stabilization increases and will ultimately converge to its optimal value
under monetary commitment. However, though the inﬂation bias can thus be
brought, the ﬁscal spending bias in turn will increase compared to the case with-
out a conservative central banker. The reason is that lower inﬂation rates reduce
the inﬂationary pressure and hence make ﬁscal overspending more attractive. Nev-
ertheless, Adam and Billi ﬁnd that the net welfare eﬀects of weight conservatism
are still positive, since the welfare gains due to reduced trend inﬂation more than
outweight the welfare losses caused by an increased ﬁscal spending bias40.
In the case of ﬁscal leadership the achieved welfare gains are even more pronounced,
since there the ﬁscal policymaker internalizes the within-period eﬀects of his pol-
icy choices on the monetary authority's reaction function. This causes that in the
39This loss term is similar to the inﬂation loss term employed in Section 4 and will punish both
positive and negative deviations of inﬂation from its Ramsey optimal value of zero.
40The drawback of this result is that it clearly hinges on the availability of lump sum taxes.
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extreme case of a fully conservative central banker41 both the inﬂation- and the
ﬁscal spending bias can be eliminated, which will result in the implementation of
a second best equilibrium.
In a nutshell, Adam and Billi (2008) conclude that also in an environment with
endogenous ﬁscal policy the introduction of a conservative central banker still re-
mains desirable42. In one very special case, that is with ﬁscal leadership and a
fully conservative monetary authority, overall welfare even reaches a second best
equilibrium level. However, though Adam and Billi show that this result is quite
robust to parameter changes, it still hinges to a large degree on the assumption
of lump-sum taxation. At least in the case of monetary leadership and simulta-
neous policy choices the exclusion of lump sum taxation might signiﬁcantly alter
the results. Since lump-sum taxes are hardly observed in reality, this issue can
be pointed out as one drawback of the paper. However, the result under ﬁscal
leadership (which the authors view as the most realistic timing) is less vulnerable
to the assumption of lump sum taxation, such that the overall conclusion of a
welfare-improving conservative central banker is still valid.
41That is a monetary policymaker, who attaches zero weight on the households' utility maxi-
mization.
42This explanation has obviously abstracted from any stabilization costs of increased conser-
vatism. However, Adam and Billi also show that the increases in stabilization costs are of a
negligible magnitude compared to the optimal state-contingent stabilization response under
policy commitment.
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6.2 Weight conservatism and public debt
6.2.1 The model setup
The model setup in Niemann (2009) diﬀers from the framework used by Adam
and Billi (2008) in various aspects. While the above model is clearly of a New-
Keynesian form, Niemann assumes a dynamic ﬂexible price economy with money
and nominal debt, which -in contrast to Adam and Billi (2008)- abstracts from
stochastic economic disturbances. Also Niemann assumes a continuum of inﬁnitely
lived households, whose preferences are given by
∞∑
t=0
βt{log(ct)− αnt}, (6.1)
where ct again denotes period t consumption of some consumption good, nt deﬁnes
the period t labor eﬀort and 0 < β < 1 the discount factor. In contrast to Adam
and Billi (2008), public goods provision g will be both constant and exogenously
determined, and will not yield any utility for households.
In every period households face the following budget constraint:
Mt+1 +Bt+1 ≤Mt − Pt(1 + τ ct )ct +Bt(1 +Rt) +Wtnt, (6.2)
where the amount of nominal balances carried over to the next period (cash,Mt+1,
plus bonds, Bt+1) on the left hand side has to be smaller or equal than the nominal
stock of wealth held in the current period, consisting of current cash holdings,
Mt, minus expenditures for consumption goods, Pt(1 + τ
c
t )ct, (with τ
c
t being a
consumption tax rate), plus repayments of last period's bond purchases, Bt(1+Rt)
(principal plus interest gains) and nominal wage earnings,Wtnt. The timing in the
economy will be such that the asset market opens only after the goods market has
closed. Thus households are constrained to use only their nominal cash holdings
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carried over from the previous period for the purchase of consumption goods. This
leads to the following cash-in-advance constraint
Mt ≥ Pt(1 + τ ct )ct. (6.3)
Inﬂation in this economy has two eﬀects: First, anticipated inﬂation triggers a
corresponding increase in the nominal interest rate and second, surprise inﬂation
acts as a lump-sum tax on the nominal cash holdings of households (see equation
(6.3)).
Concerning political authorities, there will be again a monetary and a ﬁscal pol-
icymaker, who will undertake their decisions independently in a non-cooperative
fashion. The period t policy instrument of the monetary policymaker will be the
overall nominal money supply Mat+1
43, where the superscript a shall distinguish
individual from aggregate variables. The ﬁscal policymaker's instruments, in turn,
are the consumption tax rate τ ct and the stock of government bonds issued in pe-
riod t, Bat+1. Using these three instruments both policymakers have to fulﬁll the
following intertemporal budget constraint44:
Mat+1 +B
a
t+1 + Ptτ
c
t ≥Mat +Bat (1 +Rt) + Ptg. (6.4)
I turn next to the objective function of both policymakers. In a ﬁrst instance,
the ﬁscal policymaker will again try to maximize the household utility in every
period. However, this ﬁscal policymaker will be more impatient than the private
sector, meaning that his discount factor will be biased downwards compared to
43The monetary authority will determine Mat+1 only after households have chosen their stock of
cash holdings for the next period.
44Note that the role of the monetary authority in this model is being restricted to a public
ﬁnance function.
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household's discount factor45. The objective function of the ﬁscal authority thus
is ∞∑
t=0
δt{log(ct)− αnt}, (6.5)
with δ < β.
The monetary policymaker's goal in turn will be to maximize a weighted sum of
the households utility and an inﬂation loss term:
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−γ
(
1 + pit
1 + piet
)2
+ (1− γ)[log(ct)− αnt]
}
, (6.6)
with pit =
Pt
Pt−1
− 1 the period t inﬂation rate and piet the expected inﬂation rate.
The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) measures the relative weight which the monetary au-
thorities attaches to utility maximizations versus inﬂation losses minimization.
Due to the intertemporal budget constraint there will be a dynamic interplay
between the ﬁscal and the monetary policymaker, in which the real stock of gov-
ernment liabilities will take the role of an endogenous state variable. A time incon-
sistency problem arises since the impatient ﬁscal policymaker will seek to postpone
tax-caused distortions into the future which will lead to an excessive accumulation
of public debt, whereas the monetary policymaker in turn will be tempted to use
surprise inﬂation in order to reduce the real value of this outstanding debt stock46.
45Such ﬁscal impatience may have various reasons, for example electoral concerns of political
representatives (Niemann, 2009, p. 2).
46Importantly note that since public debt ultimately has to be ﬁnanced via distortionary activity
(i.e. either via consumption taxes or via money creation, see again equation (6.4)), the
outstanding stock of public debt has negative welfare implications.
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6.2.2 Equilibrium in the “undistorted” economy
Since both policymakers lack intertemporal commitment, equilibrium strategies
once again have to be sequentially optimal. Like in Adam and Billi (2008) also Nie-
mann restricts his attention to Markov-perfect equilibria of the dynamic game47.
These Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies can be described by two generalized
Euler equations (GEEs); one for the ﬁscal and one for the monetary policymaker.
Both Euler equations equate the marginal welfare gains from increasing consump-
tion today (via lowering the consumption tax or a reduction of the inﬂation tax)
to the marginal costs of facing a higher level of real debt in the next period. A
steady state is thus reached when the marginal incentives for accumulating and
decumulating real debt just balance in both Euler equations.
In order to create a benchmark case, Niemann ﬁrst considers the case where δ = β
and γ = 0 holds (no ﬁscal impatience, no conservative central banker). The ob-
jective of both policymakers thus reduces to maximize household utility in every
period. In this benchmark setup Niemann identiﬁes two possible steady states,
where it is the initial level of real debt which ultimately pins down to which of
these two steady states the economy will converge. If the initial stock of real public
assets is suﬃciently high, the economy will stabilize at a completely undistorted
equilibrium, at which the entire ﬂow of public expenditures can be ﬁnanced via
interest earnings such that both the consumption and the inﬂation tax will be zero.
However, for lower real values of initial assets or for any real level of initial public
debt this undistorted equilibrium will be infeasible and the economy will converge
to a second, distorted equilibrium. At this equilibrium the debt stock will be zero,
but the equilibrium level of consumption will be smaller than in the previous case,
47Due to their very deﬁnition, Markov strategies are always time consistent.
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since now public expenditure has to be ﬁnanced via distortionary activities of the
policymakers.
6.2.3 Equilibrium with fiscal impatience and monetary conservatism
Yet, just additionally introducing ﬁscal impatience is suﬃcient to trigger a collapse
of both of the above equilibira. The reason is that since ﬁscal impatience causes the
ﬁscal authority to discount future utility at a higher rate than the monetary policy-
maker or the households, his preferences will consequently shift from tax ﬁnancing
to debt ﬁnancing, thus leading to positive values of real debt. The interesting key
ﬁnding of Niemann is that additionally introducing a conservative central banker
increases the incentives of the policymaker to accumulate debt. This unexpected
outcome results out of the interplay of several factors in this model:
First Niemann proves that for any degree of ﬁscal impatience the elasticity of
money growth around the steady state level of real debt has to be positive. This
issue is also intuitively plausible: Since the monetary policymaker tries to prevent
the impatient ﬁscal policymaker from running into excessive debt, he will pun-
ish every deviation from the steady state level of real debt with increased money
growth, that is an increase in inﬂation. Importantly, the strength of this re-
sponse, that is the elasticity of money growth, will be increasing in the degree of
ﬁscal impatience; the more the ﬁscal policymaker edges to the lax side and seeks
to accumulate debt, the stronger has to be the marginal inﬂation response in order
to prevent him from doing so. As a ﬁrst result, the steady state level of real debt
(and also of any other steady state variable, such as consumption, inﬂation or
the consumption tax) will be independent of the degree of ﬁscal impatience. The
degree of ﬁscal impatience only aﬀects the steady state elasticity of money growth.
If one further introduces a weight conservative central banker, additionally a direct
and an indirect eﬀect kick in. First, the direct eﬀect of weight conservatism is that
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the monetary authority will be less willing to use inﬂation in order to prevent the
policymaker from accumulating debt. Accordingly at any given level of real debt,
the elasticity of money growth and thus the strength of the inﬂation response
around th steady state will decrease. However, and this is the crucial point in this
paper, this behavior will be internalized by the ﬁscal policymaker. The indirect
eﬀect of monetary conservatism then is that the ﬁscal policymaker, which will now
be less disciplined by the monetary authority for steady state deviations, will be
tempted to accumulate more debt, up to a new higher steady state level of real
debt. At this higher steady state level the money growth elasticity has reached
again its original level and thus the ﬁscal authority will again refrain from further
accumulating debt. However, at this new steady state also the other model vari-
ables will have changed, especially consumption will be lower and inﬂation will be
higher compared to the case without weight conservatism.
The surprising eﬀect of the conservative central banker in this model thus is that
instead of lowering long run inﬂation he will increase long run inﬂation. The
elasticity of money growth around the steady state however stays unaﬀected from
monetary conservatism. Using numerical simulations in order to measure the wel-
fare eﬀects of a conservative central banker, Niemann ﬁnally shows that the direct
welfare gains during transition (lower degree of surprise inﬂation) are more than
outweighted by the long run costs of increased real debt and the end result thus
is that the introduction of a conservative central banker has negative welfare im-
plications.
Via considering also the indirect eﬀects of lower long run inﬂation on public debt
accumulation, Niemann adopts a broader perspective on monetary conservatism
which has not yet been considered in the theoretical literature. By showing that
under the assumption of ﬁscal impatience a weight conservative central banker will
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cause higher equilibrium levels of both real debt and inﬂation he challenges the
main theoretical results on the desirability of a conservative central banker pre-
sented thus far. Note though that Niemann (2009) does not question the ability of
a conservative central banker to bring down trend inﬂation as such, but he rather
points out that these low inﬂation rates can have adverse eﬀects on ﬁscal policy
behavior, whose welfare eﬀects might be more pronounced than the initial positive
eﬀects of reduced inﬂation.
Finally, in the light of the current European debt crisis this theoretical result might
be of particular interest, since it provides an explanation why several south Euro-
pean countries have accumulated such high levels of public debt since their acces-
sion to the EMU. Additionally it strengthens the theoretical support for combining
monetary conservative regimes with legal ﬁscal deﬁcit limits and debt ceilings, such
as the European stability and growth pact.
7 Summary and Conclusion
The aim of my thesis was to give a detailed overview of the theoretical concepts
which underlie the series of pronounced central bank reforms observed over the last
twenty to thirty years. After a brief summary of some general inﬂation-related facts
I turned to the presentation of the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy
and the resulting inﬂation bias, where I used a simple Keynesian model in order to
illustrate the problem also formally. I further proceeded with introducing several
concepts which aim at reducing this socially costly inﬂation bias, where I put the
main focus on the idea of the independent, weight conservative central banker.
In the ﬁnal section I reviewed two micro-based model frameworks, in which the
implications of such a weight conservative central banker within an environment
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with endogenous ﬁscal policy and public debt are considered.
The literature on time-consistent monetary policies has shown that even ratio-
nal, benevolent governments may create excessive inﬂation. The entire society is
thus better oﬀ when monetary policy is delegated to an independent, conservative
central banker. This famous theoretical result derived by Rogoﬀ has contributed
an important part to the world-wide trend of central bank reforms. After several
years of experience with independent conservative monetary authorities, numerous
studies also empirically veriﬁed the negative eﬀect of monetary conservatism on
average inﬂation rates48. However, as some recently published papers indicate,
the view on monetary conservatism adapted thus far in theoretical research might
have been too narrow in order to capture the entire welfare eﬀects of a conservative
central banker. Model frameworks with endogenous ﬁscal policy and public debt
show that the eﬀects of weight conservatism are less clear-cut than most of the
literature suggests. These ﬁndings do not challenge the concept of independent,
conservative central banks as such, but rather indicate that more attention should
be attached to the interaction between monetary conservatism and ﬁscal policy.
48For a summary of this literature see for example Berger et al. (2001).
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Appendix A
A.1 The first best solution and its infeasibility
The social loss function presented in Section 4.4.2 assumes that due to labor mar-
ket imperfections the natural rate of employment is too low to be socially eﬃcient,
meaning that welfare can be improved by pushing employment temporary above
its natural level using activist monetary policy. The obvious questions linked to
that assumption clearly are from where such imperfections actually originate and
whether they can be reduced or even eliminated.
The possible sources of distortions in labor markets are numerous (see for example
the derivations of aggregate supply in Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005) or
Blanchard and Illing (2004)). First, excessive real wages can make the implemen-
tation of a socially optimal natural employment rate infeasible. Such high real
wages can arise due to imperfect competition and monopoly power, or because
of ineﬃciently high unemployment beneﬁts49 (see Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen,
2005, pages 524ﬀ). Furthermore, also powerful trade unions can prevent the real
wage from falling to its socially optimal level. Finally it can be possible that also
ﬁrms prefer to pay higher real wages, for example in order to motivate their em-
ployees50.
49Since these beneﬁts constitute one component of the opportunity costs of working.
50For a positive theory on equilibrium wages above the market clearing level see the literature on
eﬃciency wage models, for example Akerlof and Yellen (1986) or Romer (2006), pages 438ﬀ.
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Another source of labor market ineﬃciencies are high income taxes. Since such
taxes breech the gap between the gross wage which the employer has to bear and
the net wage which the worker receives at the end of the day, in the presence of
high income taxation labor supply at any given gross wage might be ineﬃciently
low.
Since this list of possible labor market distortions could be continued almost arbi-
trarily, the removal of all of these distortive factors will most likely be infeasible
in reality51 (see for example Rogoﬀ, 1985; Lohmann, 1992 or Svensson, 1995),
which thus makes also the implementation of a ﬁrst best labor market equilibrium
impossible. Additionally note that even if one would consider the removal of all
labor market distortions as practicable, there would still remain other incentives
for creating unanticipated inﬂation, as the discussion in Section 2.3.3 has shown.
The consequence thus is, no matter whether one believes that all labor market
distortions can be eliminated or not, it is highly unrealistic or even impossible to
remove all possible temptations for the policymaker to create surprise inﬂation.
However, since it is exactly these temptations which will result in an inﬂationary
bias, it is commonly assumed that the ﬁrst best solution is infeasible in reality.
51For example consider that though income taxation or unemployment beneﬁts might distort
the labor supply, they also constitute important means of redistribution and help maintaining
social peace. Thus their complete removal would encounter serious public resistance.
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A.2 Mathematical derivation of the general expected social
loss function
The general expected social loss function under any arbitrary policy regime (equa-
tion (4.24)) is obtained via several modiﬁcations of the policymaker's general loss
function (A.1):
LAt = (
zt
η
+
(pt − w¯t)
α
− (n˜− n¯))2 + χ (pt − pt−1 − p˜i)2 . (A.1)
First, a decomposition of (A.1) gives
(n˜− n¯)2 +
(
zt
η
+
(pt − w¯t)
α
)2
−2zt
η
(n˜− n¯)−2(pt − w¯t)
α
(n˜− n¯)+χ (pt − pt−1 − p˜i)2 .
(A.2)
Next, substituting w¯Dt − p¯iD for pt−1 in equation (A.2)52 yields
(n˜−n¯)2+
(
zt
η
+
(pAt − w¯At )
α
)2
−2zt
η
(n˜−n¯)−2(p
A
t − w¯At )
α
(n˜−n¯)+χ (pAt − w¯At + p¯iA − p˜i)2 ,
(A.3)
where the superscripts have been changed from D to A in order to emphasize that
here the expected social losses under any arbitrary policy regime are considered.
Once again rearranging the diﬀerent terms gives
(n˜− n¯)2 +
(
zt
η
+
(pAt − w¯At )
α
)2
+ χ
(
p¯iA − p˜i)2−
−2χ(p
A
t − w¯At )
αχ
(n˜− n¯) + χ(pAt − w¯At )2 + 2χ(pAt − w¯At )(p¯iA − p˜i).
52One can use pDt and w¯
D
t (and thus also p¯i
D
t ) for the derivation of the general expected social loss
function, since these strategies are actually general expressions, describing optimal behavior
of the policymaker and the wage setters whenever decisions are made sequentially and none
of the players faces additional constraints.
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Using p¯iD− p˜i = p¯iA− p˜i = (n˜−n¯)
χα
and employing the fact that w¯At = Et−1pt simpliﬁes
the above expression considerably to
(n˜− n¯)2 +
(
zt
η
+
(pAt − w¯At )
α
)2
+ χ
(
p¯iA − p˜i)2 + χ(pAt − w¯At )2. (A.4)
Finally taking t− 1 expectations over the entire expression yields the expected
social loss function under any arbitrary policy regime as presented in Section 4.6.1:
(n˜− n¯)2 +χ (p¯iA − p˜i)2 +Et−1{(zt
η
+
(pAt − Et−1(pAt ))
α
)2
+ χ(pAt − Et−1(pAt ))2
}
.
(A.5)
A.3 Necessary parameter conditions for the dominance of
the rule outcome
In order to identify the exact parameter conditions under which commitment yields
a socially better result than discretion, I ﬁrst rewrite the expected social losses
under both regimes:
Et−1LRt = (n˜− n¯)2 +
σ2z
η2
, (A.6)
Et−1LDt = (n˜− n¯)2 +
(n˜− n¯)2
α2χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠD
+
σ2z
η2
α2χ
(1 + α2χ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓD
. (A.7)
Not surprisingly, a ﬁrst inspection of both expressions shows that the regime inde-
pendent dead weight loss term (n˜−n¯)2 is identical across both policy regimes. How-
ever, further comparisons illustrate that additional welfare losses under commit-
ment just result out of the policymaker's inability to counteract economic shocks,
whereas under discretion there arise both stabilization and inﬂation costs, though
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expected stabilization costs are smaller than under commitment53. The condition
under which commitment dominates discretion is thus straight forward: Commit-
ment to a policy rule yields a socially better result than discretion whenever the
expected social losses due to increased employment volatility are smaller than the
expected social gains from bringing down long run inﬂation, that is whenever
σ2z
η2
<
(n˜− n¯)2
α2χ
+
σ2z
η2
α2χ
1 + α2χ
(A.8)
holds. Employing the fact that η ≡ α(1 + ωα), this inequality can be further
simpliﬁed to
σ2z
χ
(1 + α2χ)(1 + αω)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
< (n˜− n¯)2. (A.9)
As equation (A.9) shows, the condition for the dominance of the commitment
regime ﬁnally boils down to a relation between the supply shock variance and the
degree of labor market imperfections: Whenever the variance of the stochastic
supply shock times an expression smaller than one is smaller than the squared
diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the second best labor market equilibrium, then
commitment yields a socially better result than discretion. Thus there can only
be identiﬁed two very rare cases at which a discretionary regime should be pre-
ferred over policy commitment: Either when the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst best
employment rate and the distorted second best employment rate is very small, or
when the variance of the supply shock term z is very large.
53Note that the stabilization cost term
σ2z
η2 is multiplied by
α2χ
(1+α2χ) < 1.
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A.4 Monetary conservatism and the inflation bias: A
graphical interpretation
Conducting a graphical analysis of the time inconsistency problem demonstrates
the dilemma in which a policymaker ﬁnds himself in an illustrative, clear-cut way.
For that reason here I will once again summarize the main results of Sections
4 and 5 in a graphical way. These results are the time inconsistency of policy
commitment, the existence of a discretionary inﬂation bias and the improvement
upon discretion via the introduction of a weight conservative central banker.
For this purpose I ﬁrst conduct a simple modiﬁcation of the discretionary policy
rule (4.19) in order to obtain a best response function of the policymaker to already
established inﬂation expectations54,
F (pie) = pit =
χα2p˜i + α(n˜− n¯)
1 + α2χ
+
piet
1 + α2χ
, (A.10)
where I once again used the fact that E − t− 1(pt) = w¯t.
Next this best response function F is plotted together with the 45 degree line in a
(pie, pi) space: Since at any stable rational expectations equilibrium policy expec-
tations have to coincide with policy realizations, clearly any equilibrium has to be
located on the 45 degree line. As ﬁgure A.1 shows, if people expect zero inﬂation
there is a large beneﬁt from creating surprise inﬂation and thus the best response
function F (pie) has a positive intercept (which equals the ﬁrst term in equation
(A.10)). However, also at the expected inﬂation rate implied by the policy rule,
pieR, the optimal response function of the policymaker lies above the 45 degree line.
Accordingly also at pieR the policymaker will deviate from his preannounced strat-
54Here I will abstract from economic disturbances, such that zt = 0.
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D
0 pieR = p˜i piD pi
e
Figure A.1 Graphical interpretation of the time inconsistency problem
egy and will create surprise inﬂation equal to piDev−piR. Policy commitment is thus
a time inconsistent strategy and can therefore not constitute a stable rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. Wage setters, internalizing this issue, will therefore adjust
their inﬂation expectations upwards, which will reduce the policymaker's incen-
tives to create surprise inﬂation, until inﬂation expectations ﬁnally reach point E.
At this point the best response function of the policymaker intersects with the 45
degree line, meaning that further inﬂating beyond expectations no longer pays oﬀ
for the policymaker and therefore a stable equilibrium establishes. However, since
the equilibrium inﬂation rate at point E, piD, is situated well above the socially
optimal inﬂation rate p˜i, the equilibrium is subject to an inﬂation bias.
As Section 5 has shown, this unsatisfactory outcome can be improved via the
introduction of an independent weight conservative central banker. In order to
illustrate this also graphically, one needs again the best response function of such
a conservative central banker to already established inﬂation expectations. Since
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the algorithm for calculating this best response function is identical to the stan-
dard discretionary case, one obtains this function simply by substituting (χ + )
for χ in (A.10).
FB(pie) = piBt =
(χ+ )α2p˜i + α(n˜− n¯)
1 + α2(χ+ )
+
piet
1 + α2(χ+ )
. (A.11)
Next I plot this best response function FB(pie) together with the original best re-
sponse function (the dotted line in Figure A.2) and the 45 degree line again into
a (pie, pi) space. As ﬁgure A.2 demonstrates, both the intercept and the slope of
piD pie
pi
p˜i
45
E
piB
B
Figure A.2 The reduction of trend inﬂation by a conservative central banker
the conservative central banker's best response function are now smaller compared
to the previously considered case55, since at any level of expected inﬂation the
conservative central banker is less willing to use surprise inﬂation in order to stim-
55For the intercept to be smaller than under discretion additionally the condition p˜i < α(n˜− n¯)
has to hold.
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ulate the economy. Consequently at point B, where FB(pie) intersect with the 45
degree line, the established long run inﬂation rate is lower than under discretion,
which shows that the implementation of a conservative central banker helps to
bring down average inﬂation. However, as the formal derivation above already
indicated, weight conservatism just manages to reduce, but not to eliminate the
inﬂation bias. Therefore also under a conservative central banker equilibrium in-
ﬂation is still located above the socially optimal level, as Figure A.2 illustrates.
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Appendix B
B.1 Abstract
This thesis examines the theoretical concepts which have contributed to the world
wide trend of central bank reforms. Since governments can not credibly commit to
a non-activist monetary policy, long run inﬂation rates are ineﬃciently high, which
causes a reduction in social welfare. This inﬂation bias can be diminished by dele-
gating monetary policy to an independent central bank, which additionally has to
be more inﬂation averse than the government. The economics literature has sug-
gested various concepts for the setup of such independent central banks, where the
conservative central banker has probably been the most inﬂuential among them.
This conservative central banker reduces average inﬂation rates and improves so-
cial welfare by attaching a relatively higher weight to inﬂation stabilization than
society would. Many political authorities around the world followed this proposal
and created independent central banks, which were charged with the main goal of
implementing low and stable inﬂation. However, current research which investi-
gates monetary conservatism from a broader perspective suggests that the welfare
eﬀects of a conservative central banker are less clear-cut than the existing literature
would indicate. Especially if the interactions between monetary conservatism and
public debt are considered, the implementation of a conservative central banker
might even have adverse welfare eﬀects.
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B.2 Abstract (German)
Diese Diplomarbeit behandelt jene theoretischen Konzepte, welche den weltweiten
Trend an Zentralbank-Reformen mit auslösten. Die Tatsache, dass Regierungen
sich nicht glaubhaft auf eine passive Geldpolitik festlegen können, bewirkt in der
Folge systematisch hohe Inﬂationsraten, die eine Reduktion des sozialen Wohl-
stands implizieren. Dieser Inﬂations-Bias kann verringert werden, indem die Geld-
politik einer unabhängigen Zentralbank übertragen wird, welche darüber hinaus in-
ﬂationären Tendenzen mehr abgeneigt ist als die Regierung. Die ökonomische Lit-
eratur brachte diverse Vorschläge für die Ausgestaltung einer solchen Zentralbank
hervor, wobei der conservative central banker wahrscheinlich den größten Ein-
ﬂuss auf praktische Reformentwicklungen hatte. Dieser Zentralbänker reduziert die
durchschnittliche Inﬂation und erhöht den sozialen Wohlstand, indem er Inﬂation-
sschwankungen eine relativ höhere Wertigkeit beimisst als dies in der Gesellschaft
geschieht. Diesem Vorschlag folgten weltweit viele Regierungen, indem sie un-
abhängige Zentralbanken schufen und eine niedrige stabile Inﬂation als deren
Hauptziel festlegten. Aktuelle Forschungsarbeiten, welche dieses Konzept aus einer
breiteren Perspektive betrachten, deuten jedoch darauf hin, dass die Wohlstand-
seﬀekte einer konservativen Zentralbank weit weniger eindeutig sind als in der
bisherigen Literatur angenommen wird. Speziell unter Miteinbeziehung der Wech-
selwirkungen zwischen konservativer Geldpolitik und Staatsschulden kann die Ein-
richtung einer konservativen Zentralbank sogar den sozialen Wohlstand reduzieren.
76
B.3 Curriculum Vitae
Personal Information
Name: Alexander Gruber
Date of Birth: 2/8/1986
Place of Birth: Vienna, Austria
Education
03/2008 - present: Studies of Law and Economics
Vienna University of Economics and Business
10/2005 - present: Studies of Economics
University of Vienna
09/1996 - 06/2004: High School, Graduation with Distinction
BRG 15 Auf der Schmelz, Vienna
Working Experience
08-09/2010: Trainee
Austrian Trade Commission, São Paulo, Brazil
09/2009: Intern
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria
08/2009: Trainee
Austrian Federal Competition Authority, Vienna, Austria
08/2008: Intern
Statistics Austria, Vienna, Austria
77

Bibliography
Andrew B. Abel and Ben Bernanke. Macroeconomics. Pearson Addison Wesley, 5
edition, 2005.
Klaus Adam and Roberto M. Billi. Monetary conservatism and ﬁscal policy. Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 55:137688, 2008.
George A. Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen. Eﬃciency wage models of the labor market.
University of Cambridge, 1986.
Robert Barro and David Gordon. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of
monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1983a.
Robert Barro and David Gordon. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural
rate model. The Journal of Political Economy, 91(4):589610, 1983b.
Helge Berger, Jakob de Haan, and Sylvester Eijﬃnger. Central bank independence:
An update of theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15, 2001.
Olivier Blanchard and Gerhard Illing. Makroökonomie. Pearson Studium, 3 edi-
tion, 2004.
Michael F. Bryan. On the origin an evolution of the word inﬂation. Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, 1997.
V.V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy,
98:783802, 1990.
79
Javier Díaz-Giménez, Giorgia Giovannetti, Ramon Marimon, and Pedro Teles.
Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy. Review of Economic Dynamics,
2008.
Gerald P. Dwyer Jr. Rules and discretion in monetary policy. Journal of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis, pages 313, 1993.
Andrea Ferrero. Fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union. ECB working
paper No. 502, 2005.
Stanley Fischer. Modern approaches to central banking. NBER working paper
series, 1995.
Stanley Fischer. Why are central banks pursuing long-run price stability? Journal
of the Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 734, 1996.
Stanley Fischer and Franco Modigliani. Towards an understanding of the real
eﬀects and costs of inﬂation. NBER working paper series, 1978.
Milton Friedman. A Program for Monetary Stability. Fordham University Press,
1960.
Milton Friedman. Inﬂation. Causes and Consequences. Proquest Info & Learning,
1963.
Peter N. Ireland. Sustainable monetary policies. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 1997.
George Katona. The psychology of inﬂation. In Richard D. Curtin, editor, Surveys
of Costumers, 1974-75, pages 919. Institute for Social Research, University of
Michigan, 1976.
80
John Maynard Keynes. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
Palgrave Mcmillian, 1936.
Paul Klein, Per Krusell, and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull. Time-consistent public policy.
Review of Economic Studies, 75:789808, 2008.
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott. Rules rather than discretion: The inconsis-
tency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3):473490, 1977.
David E. W. Laidler and Michael Parkin. Inﬂation: A survey. Economic Journal,
85:741809, 1975.
Francesco Lippi. Strategic monetary policy with non-atomistic wage setters. Re-
view of Economic Studies, 70:909919, 2003.
Ben Lockwood, Marcus Miller, and Lei Zhang. Designing monetary policy when
unemployment persists. Technical report, University of Exeter, 1995.
Susanne Lohmann. The optimal degree of commitment. credibility and ﬂexibility.
American Economic Review, 82(1):273286, 1992.
Robert E. Lucas Jr. Rules, discretion and the role of the economic advisor. In
Stanley Fischer, editor, Rational Expectations and Economic Policy, pages 199
210. University Chicag Press, 1980.
N. Gregory Mankiw. Makroökonomik. Schäﬀer-Poeschel Verlag Stuttgart, 5 edi-
tion, 2003.
Fernando M. Martin. A positive theory of government debt. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 2009.
81
Bennett T. McCallum. Inﬂation expectations. In Steven N. Durlauf and
Lawrence E. Blume, editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online.
Palgrave Macmillian, 2008. Online version, access: November 3rd 2010.
Patrick Minford and David Peel. Advanced Macroeconomics. A Primer. Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2002.
Stefan Niemann. Dynamic monetary-ﬁscal interactions and the role of monetary
conservatism. Discussion Papers, University of Essex, 2009.
Central Bank of Iceland. Monetary bulletin 2007-2. Technical report, 2007. URL:
http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getﬁle.aspx?itemid=5325.
Michael Parkin. inﬂation. In Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, editors,
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillian, 2008.
Online version, access: November 11th 2010.
Kenneth Rogoﬀ. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary
target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 11691190, 1985.
David Romer. Advanced Macroeconomics. McGraw-Hill, 3 edition, 2006.
Julio Rotemberg. Sticky prices in the united states. The Journal of Political
Economy, 90:11871211, 1982.
Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace. rational expectations, the optimal mone-
tary instrument, and the optimal monetary rule. The Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 83(2):24154, 1975.
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Matias Tapia. Monetary policy implementation and
results in twenty inﬂation-targeting countries. Technical Report working paper
no 166, Central Bank of Chile, 2002.
82
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé and Martin Uribe. Optimal simple and implementable
monetary and ﬁscal rules. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54:17021725, 2007.
Robert J. Shiller. Why do people dislike inﬂation? In Christina D. Romer and
David H. Romer, editors, Reducing Inﬂation: Motivation and Strategy. Univer-
sity of Chicage Press, 1997.
Henry Simons. Rules versus authorities in monetary policy. Journal of Political
Economy, pages 130, 1936.
Peter B. Sørensen and Hans J. Whitta-Jacobsen. Introducing advanced Macroeco-
nomics. McGraw-Hill, 2005.
Lars E.O. Svensson. Optimal inﬂation targets, 'conservative' central banks, and
linear inﬂation contracts. The American Economic Review, 1995.
Stephen J. Turnovsky. Macroeconomic Analysis and Stabilization Policies. Cam-
bridge University Press, 1977.
Neil Wallace. Why the fed should consider holding m0 constant. Federal Reserve
of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, pages 210, 1977.
Carl Walsh. Optimal contracts for independent central bankers. American Eco-
nomic Review, 85(2):150167, 1995.
83
